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EARLY SPECULATIVE BUBBLES
AMD INCREASES IN THE
SUPPLY OP MONEY
This paper examines three episodes in economic history that
are commonly referred to as "speculative bubbles."

The three

bubbles analyzed are: Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble and the
South Sea Bubble.

The paper views these three events in a

historical context emphasizing the monetary interventions
particular to each episode.
The Rational Expectations and Keynesian school's treatments of
speculative bubbles are considered and rejected.

The life and

monetary theories of John Law are examined extensively, given his
influence over the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles.

Law is also

indirectly connected to the Tulipmania, having been influenced by
the operation of the Bank of Amsterdam.
The conclusion of the thesis is that speculative bubbles are
engendered by increases in the supply of money, with future bubbles
being inevitable given fractional reserve banking and Keynesian
monetary policies.

The reason for the malinvestments caused by

monetary interventions is illuminated by the Austrian trade cycle
theory.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Speculative bubbles have occurred throughout history.

These

episodes are characterized by a continuous sharp rise in the
price of a particular asset

or group of related assets,

leading to further price increases driven by new speculators,
seeking profits through even higher prices.

These higher

prices are driven by the potential profits to be made through
trading, rather than the earning capacity or economic value of
the asset.

These speculative manias then come to abrupt and

dramatic endings, as expectations change and buyers quickly
become

sellers,

in

mass.

The

consequences

are

often

disastrous, with the ensuing crash inflicting financial pain
on the region or country involved. Euphoria turns to despair
as the mandatory readjustment that takes place in the economy
creates massive worker dislocation,

and great

numbers

of

bankruptcies.
Contemporary economist's views concerning speculative
bubbles vary.

The rational expectations school questions

whether speculative bubbles can happen at all, given rational
markets.

Kindleberger

(1987,

rational expectations viewpoint.

281)

concisely

gives

the
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Rational expectations theory holds that prices are
formed within the limits of available information
by market participants using standard economic
models appropriate to the circumstances. As such,
it is claimed, market prices cannot diverge from
fundamental values unless the information proves to
have been widely wrong. The theoretical literature
uses the assumption of the market having one mind
and one purpose,....
History tells a different story, of course.

Market

speculators at various times in history have bid up prices to
extraordinary levels, not based upon fundamental values, but
with the expectation of selling the asset in question at an
even higher price and thus making a profit.

This is sometimes

referred to as the "greater fool theory."
John Maynard Keynes spends an entire chapter (chapter 12)
of The General

Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

discussing speculation and bubbles, pointing to five factors
which foster these episodes:

1)

neophyte investors owning an

increased proportion of capital investment;

2)

the day-to-

day price fluctuations having an excessive influence over the
market;

3) violent changes in the mass psychology of ignorant

individuals

changing asset valuations;

4)

professional

investors devoting their skills to "anticipating what average
opinion expects the average opinion to be;" and 5) confidence,
or lack of, in the credit markets (1964, 153-58).
Keynes

(1964,

155-56)

metaphorically

describes

speculative markets:
Nor is
simple
having
so to

it necessary that anyone should keep his
faith in the conventional basis of valuation
any genuine longterm validity.
For it is,
speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of
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Musical Chairs-a pastime in which he is victor who
says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passes
the Old Maid to his neighbor before the game is
over, who secures a chair for himself when the
music stops.
Keynes (1964, 159) also touches upon the consequences of
speculative bubbles and manias.
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady
stream of enterprise. But the position is serious
when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool
of speculation. When the capital development of a
country becomes a by-product of the activities of a
casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.
Ironically, it is due to a Keynesian economic policy and
its monetary apparatus, i.e., that of expanding the supply of
money to increase economic activity, that speculative price
bubbles and manias are engendered.
John Law, whose System

This was exemplified by

(driven by a huge increase in the

supply of money) created the Mississippi Bubble in France.
Law, who preceded Keynes by two hundred years, held many of
the same views as Keynes.

As Charles Rist (quoted in Salerno

1991, 1-2) explains:
It is said that history repeats itself.
One can
say the same thing about economists.
At the
present time there is a writer whose ideas have
been repeated since Keynes, without ever being
cited by name. He is called John Law. I would be
curious to know how many, among the Anglo-Saxon
authors who have found again, all by themselves,
his principal arguments, have taken the trouble to
read him.
However, there are economists who do not feel the
episode in early eighteenth century France was a bubble.
Peter Garber (1990, 46-47) writes:
That Law's promised expansion never materialized

As

does not imply that a bubble occurred in the modern
sense of the word.
After all, this was not the
last time that a convincing economic idea would
fracture in practice.
One respectable group of
modern
economists
or another have described
Keynesian
economics,
supply
side
economics,
monetarism, fixed exchange rate regimes, floating
exchange rate regimes, and the belief in rational
expectations in asset markets as disastrously
flawed policy schemes.
Indeed, elements of the
first three were primary components in Law's
scheme.
Other contemporary economists pursue the explanation of
speculative bubbles through mathematical formulas.
surprising

that

this

search

produced nothing that aids
episodes.

for

empirical

It is not

evidence

has

in our understanding of these

The tools of econometrics were designed to explain

the movement of lifeless particles,

not the activities of

humans, who act with purpose to improve their condition in
life. In a recent article by Robert Flood and Robert Hodrick
(1990,

85),

conducted

it

is

pointed

relatively

little

out

that

formal

"academic
empirical

economists
analysis

of

actual markets until recently, probably because economist's
analytical and statistical tools were inadequate."

Messrs.

Flood and Hodrick (1990, 86) go on to pursue the case that:
"The

widespread

adoption

of

the

rational

expectations

hypothesis provided the required underpinning for theoretical
and empirical study of the issues."
above,

But, as was pointed out

those in the rational expectations school,

through

their belief that all market participants can foretell the
future, and thus only act rationally, virtually rule out the
potential

for speculative bubbles.

Unsurprisingly,

after

surveying the current empirical literature concerning bubbles,
Flood and Hodrick (1990, 99) come to the conclusion that: "The
current

empirical

tests

for

bubbles

do

not

successfully

establish the case that bubbles exist in asset prices."
This paper contends that speculative bubbles do occur,
based upon historical experience, and that these bubbles are
precipitated by a large increase in the supply of money.
monetary

intervention

creates

situations

that

manifest

themselves in ma1investment, i.e., speculative bubbles.
then follows is the required period of readjustment,
crash and depression.

This

What
i.e.,

This sequence of events is similar to

the Minsky/Kindleberger sequence of events that characterize
stock market booms and busts, as outlined by Antoin Murphy
(1986, 66-67).
(1)

The market rise starts off because of
some exogenous shock such as war, the end
of a war, a technological or natural
resource discovery, or 'a debt conversion
that
precipitously
lowers
interest
rates'.
The
shock creates
new
opportunities for profit and a boom is
engendered.

(2)

The boom is nurtured by an expansion of
bank credit which expands the money
supply.
Alternatively the velocity of
circulation increases.

(3)

As increased demand pushes up the prices
of goods and financial assets, new profit
opportunities are found and confidence
grows in the economy. Multiplier and
accelerator effects interact and the
economy enters into a 'boom or euphoric
state.'
At this point overtrading may
take place.

(4)

Overtrading may involve:
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(a)

(b)
(c)

Pure speculation, that is over
emphasis on the acquisition of
assets for capital gain rather
than income return
Overestimation of prospective
returns by companies
Excessive gearing involving the
imposition
of
low
cash
requirements on the acquisition
of financial assets through
buying on margin, by instalment
purchases, and so on.

(5)

When the neophytes, attracted by the
prospect of large capital gains for a
small outlay, become numerous in the
market, the activity assumes a separate
abnormal momentum of its own.
Insiders
recognize the danger signals and move out
of securities into money.

(6)

A financial distress period sets in as
the neophytes become aware that if there
is a rush for liquidity prices will
collapse.
The race to move out of
securities gathers pace.

(7)

Revulsion against securities develops as
banks start calling in loans and selling
collateral.

(8)

Panic sets in as the market collapses and
the question arises as to whether the
government or Central Bank should come in
and act as a lender of last resort in
what has been recently described as a
'lifeboat operation.' [Murphy's emphysis]

Help

in

accounting

for

how

speculative

initiated comes to us from the Austrian School.

bubbles

are

The Austrian

trade cycle theory serves to shed a bright light on how boombust business cycles are created, with speculative bubbles
many times being an offshoot from these business cycle booms.
The Austrian view of the trade cycle begins with the view
that, in a market economy, entrepreneurs serve as forecasters,

7

predicting what consumers will want in the future.

After

determining

task

future

wants,

they

set

about

the

of

organizing and implementing the factors of production, in the
present,

so that the product will

consumers

demand

it,

at

a

be available when the

price

sufficient

for

the

entrepreneur to reap a profit.
What happens in a bust and the subsequent depression is
that a preponderance of entrepreneurs have predicted in error
and go bankrupt.
errors?

Why is there this cluster of entrepreneurial

The answer lies not in examining the bust, but the

boom that leads up to the crisis.
The boom-bust cycle begins with a monetary intervention
into the economy.

In the modern world this occurs by way of

the banking system's excessive issue of credit.

This increase

in what Mises called "fiduciary media," or unbacked banknotes
or deposits, serves to reduce interest rates, and sends the
false signal to entrepreneurs, that consumers have changed
their consumption/investment mix to one of greater investment
and less consumption.

Businessmen then invest this increased

amount of money in capital goods, shifting resources away from
consumer goods.
Prices

and

wages ,are

then

bid

up

in

capital

goods

industries, but as this new money trickles down to consumers,
their "time preferences,"

or consumption/investment mixes,

have not actually changed, thus there is no increase in demand
for the now abundant capital goods.

The increased supply of

unwanted

capital

liquidated.

goods,

or

ma1investment, must

then

be

This liquidation is then followed by a recession

or depression, which is the economy's healing period, serving
to reallocate the factors of production to more productive and
efficient ways of satisfying customer wants (Rothbard 1983a,
15-25).
What also must be considered, when searching for what
creates an environment from which speculative bubbles can
emerge, is that age old question: What is the right amount of
money for any given economy?
economy?

Is more money beneficial for an

Does more money, constitute more wealth?

money is beneficial,

If more

then would not all the new money be

channeled into production investment?

David Hume (1970, 33)

explains what money is, and is not:
Money is
not, properly speaking, one of the
subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which
men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of
one commodity for another.
It is none of the
wheels oftrade: It is the oil which renders
the
motion of
the wheels more smooth andeasy.
Money is useful only for its exchange-value,
increase

in the supply of money,

indicates,

"does

not-unlike

benefit." [Rothbard's emphasis]

other

as Rothbard

thus an

(1985,

goods-confer

a

13)

social

Thus, if there is more money

produced in an economy, its price will drop, making all other
goods, which money is traded for, more expensive,

in money

terms.
The supply of money in the free market is determined by
the market.

So if gold is the money in a particular economy,

the market will

decide the

produced for use as money.

amount

of

gold

that will

be

All of the gold that is mined will

not be demanded by the market for use as money.

Some of the

precious metal would be channeled toward jewelry or industrial
uses.

But if by government mandate all gold is coined, even

though the market does not demand it, the effect of this over
supply of money will lead to the same malinvestments as an
increase in fiduciary media.
Three different speculative bubbles will be explored in
this paper.

The first is Tulipmania, which occurred in 1634-

37 in Amsterdam. The Tulipmania episode was spurred by the
enormous influx of silver specie, and to a lesser extent gold,
into

Amsterdam,

as

a

result

of

free

coinage

laws,

the

stability of the Bank of Amsterdam, increased trade, and the
Dutch

Navy's

success

on

the

high

seas

at

confiscating

treasure.
Next, will be a discussion about the life and theories of
perhaps the world's

first

inflationist,

John Law and the

bubble that he engineered directly, The Mississippi Bubble.
Law viewed paper money, and in fact stocks, bonds or any other
financial instruments as superior to gold or silver money.
Law, like so many after him, also felt that low interest rates
and more money were essential for a healthy thriving economy.
Law was to fuel the speculation in Mississippi Company shares
with enormous amounts of banknotes before the house of paper
finally collapsed.

The South Sea Bubble,

which occurred

almost simultaneously with the Mississippi Bubble,

was an

attempt to mirror Law's system, refinancing government debt
with the shares of the South Sea Company.

This company, whose

share price was to rise ten-fold, had no real assets and could
only make a profit from a large increase in the price of its
stock.

The share price increase was aided with increased bank

loans, and other credit.
In the final chapter these three episodes shall be viewed
in the context of the Austrian theory of malinvestment. What
will also be considered are the prospects for the continued
occurrence of speculative bubbles and the inevitable crashes
that follow, given fiat banking and the presence of ubiquitous
central banks waiting to prolong any boom and prop up any
inevitable bust.
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CHAPTER TWO

TULIPMANIA

"Tulipmania" has come to be virtually a metaphor in the
economics field.
Palgrave

(1987),

When one looks up Tulipmania in The New
a discussion

of

the

17th

century

Dutch

speculative mania will not be found. The author, Guillermo
Calvo (1987, 707), instead defines tulipmania as: "situations
in which some prices behave in a way that appears not to be
fully explainable by economic 'fundamentals'."

Calvo (1987,

707) , then goes on to use mathematical models to discuss
"...equilibria that may resemble tulipmanias, but which are
consistent with standard demand-supply analysis under the
assumption of Perfect Foresight or Rational Expectations."
Brown University economist, Peter Garber, has written
extensively about Tulipmania.

Garber's article, "Tulipmania",

found in the Journal of Political Economy (1989), sought to
explore the fundamentals of the Amsterdam tulip market in
1634-37.

After a cursory review of the historical accounts of

Tulipmania, centering for the most part on the seven pages
Charles

Mackay

devoted

to

the

subject

in

Memoirs

of

Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,
Garber initiates a discussion of the tulip and tulip markets
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of 1634 Holland.

He begins by dispensing information on the

nature of the tulip.
The tulip, being a bulb flower, can reproduce, either by
seed, or through buds formed on female bulbs.
reproduce

another

effective

method

bulb
of

if

properly

reproduction

reproduction through buds.

The buds can

cultivated,

being

that

the

of

most

asexual

The flowers of the tulip appear in

April and May, and are only in bloom for about a week.

The

bulbs can be removed from the ground in June, but must be
replanted again by September.
The extraordinary patterns some tulips display is caused
by a mosaic virus.

These patterns cannot be duplicated by

seed reproduction; it is only by cultivating the effected buds
into new bulbs that duplication can occur. The seeds produce
only common flowers that later succumb to the virus creating
new patterns.

The downside to the virus is that it subdues

the rate of reproduction.

Thus, those tulips with more exotic

patterns, were slower to reproduce, making them more scarce
and valuable than common uninfected bulbs (Garber, 1989, 54142) .
Garber's discussion of the bulb market begins with the
assertion that this market was limited to professional growers
until late 1634, when speculators entered the market, driven
by high demand for bulbs in France.

Rare bulbs were traded as

"piece" goods by weight, with the weight standard being aas,
about

one-twentieth

of

a gram.

Common

bulbs

traded

in
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standard units of 1,000 azen or one pound
Haarlem,

10,240

azen

in

Amsterdam),

with

(9,728 azen in
contracts

not

referring to specific bulbs.
Given the growing season mentioned

above,

the

market was a futures market from September to June.

tulip
Garber

(1989, 541-42) indicates that formal futures markets began in
163 6, and were the primary vehicle for trading in bulbs until
February 1637, when the market collapsed.

In the summer of

1636, trading of futures took place in taverns,
called "colleges",
fees.

in groups

with few rules restricting bidding and

Buyers were required to put up a small fraction of the

contracted amount of each deal for "wine money."

Otherwise,

Garber indicates, there was no margin required by either buyer
or seller.

On settlement date, buyers did not typically have

the required cash to settle the trade, but the sellers did not
have the bulbs to deliver either.

Thus, the trade was settled

with only a payment of the difference between the contract and
settlement

price

being

repeatedly

marked

to

collapsed,

gross

expected.

the

positions,

market;
rather

Contracts
thus
than

were

not

when

the

market

net,

had

to

be

unwound.
With the market collapse in February, 1637, no bulbs were
delivered under the deals consummated by the new futures
market.

Bulbs could not be delivered until June.

Garber says

that it's unclear as to the settlement date and price for
these

transactions.

It would

appear

that

some

sort

of

14

standard price was developed, based upon the price that the
majority of trades settled at.
Rare bulbs began to trade at increasingly higher prices
in 1635.

However, it was November 1936 before the speculation

in the common bulbs began.
1989,

541-42)

N.W. Posthumus (quoted in Garber

said the following concerning the timing of

events:
I think the sequence of events may be seen as
follows.
At the end of 1634, the new non
professional buyers came into action. Towards the
middle of 1635 prices rose rapidly, while people
could buy on credit, generally delivering at once
some article of value; at the same time the sale
per aas was introduced.
About the middle of 163 6
the colleges appeared; and soon thereafter the
trade in non-available bulbs was started, while in
November of the same year the trade was extended to
the common varieties, and bulbs were sold by the
thousand azen and per pound.
In the next section of Garber's "Tulipmania", he graphs
price data for various types of bulbs, placing time on the
horizontal axis (typically June 1636 through February 1637)
and price (guilders or Aas) on the vertical axis.

All the

graphs reflect sharply ascending slopes, at various degrees;
six out of eight graphs reflect prices exploding upward to
February 5, 1637 and plunging downward that same day.

The

graph for the Gouda bulb indicates its price peaked on January
29 and crashed on February 5 as with the other bulbs.
other graph,
information

for the Semper Augustus bulb,
on

a yearly

scale

and

shows

The

reflects price
the

peak

price

occuring in 1637 (Garber 1989, 543-45).
After the market crashed in the first week of February,
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a delegation of florists in Amsterdam on February 24th made
the proposal that tulip sales contracts consummated before
November 30, 163 6 should be executed, but that transactions
occuring after that date could be rescinded by the buyer upon
payment of ten percent of the sales price to the seller.
However, the Dutch authorities came up with their own plan on
April 27th: to suspend all contracts.
then sell contracted bulbs at the
suspension.

Thus, sellers could

market prices during this

Buyers were then responsible for the difference

between this market price and the settlement price decided by
the authorities.

By doing this, growers were released to

market bulbs to be exhumed that June.

Garber (1989, 546-49)

goes on to explain that the disposition of further contracts
is not clear, but the example of the city of Haarlem solution
is cited from Posthumus,

which permitted buyers to cancel

contracts upon payment of three and one-half percent of the
contract price.
After

a

discussion

of

eighteenth-century

tulip

and

hyacinth prices, along with modern bulb prices, Garber (1989,
547-50)

looks to answer the question:

'Tulipmania'?"

He responds to the

"Was This Episode a

issue that many works

written about the economic history of 17th century Holland
make just the slightest reference or no reference at all to
Tulipmania, by making the accurate point that, given the short
duration of the mania,
allocation of resources.

it had little effect on Holland's
Remember that bulbs must be
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planted by September and cannot be removed until June.

Thus,

at the apex of the bubble, November 163 6 through January 1637,
it was too late to plant more bulbs.
also contends that,

Garber (1989, 555-56)

in spite of the crash

in tulip bulb

prices, little wealth was transferred given that only small
settlements were required on contracts.

This author questions

this view that there was no financial pain felt from the
crash.

Other sources, that will be explored later in this

paper,

indicate that bankruptcies doubled in Amsterdam in

1637-38, a period immediately following the crash.
Garber (1989, 558) comes to the conclusion that,

"the

bulb speculation was not obvious madness, at least for most of
the 1634-37 'mania'.

Only the last month of the speculation

for common bulbs remains a potential bubble..."
price

of

the

common

bulb,

the

Witte

Indeed, the

Croonen,

rose

by

approximately 26 times in January 1637, and subsequently fell
to one-twentieth of its peak price the first week in February,
1637 (Garber 1989, 556).
Economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger has written
extensively on manias and bubbles.

His book, Manias, Panics,

and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises [1978] (1989), is
considered among the definitive books on the subject.

But

Tulipmania, despite being a modern day metaphor for mania, is
given but scant mention in a footnote on page seven of the
second (1989) edition, as follows:
Manias such as the Lubeck crises 100 years earlier,
or the tulip mania of 1634 are too isolated and
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lack the characteristic monetary features that come
with the spread of banking after the opening of the
eighteenth century.
Peter Garber has dealt at
length with the tulip mania.
He distinguishes a
"bubble" from ordinary economic fluctuations: the
latter are determined by "fundamentals," while the
former
deviates from the set of prices that
fundamentals would call for.
In the tulip mania,
which he suggests was not a bubble, the fundamental
accounting for the enormous rise of some tulip
prices was the difficulty of producing them.
In

A

Financial

History

of

Western

Europe

(1984),

Kindleberger refers to tulip mania as "probably the high
watermark in bubbles," yet only devotes five lines to the
subject in the entire book (1984, 215, 272) .

Judging by his

treatment of the subject, it would appear that Kindleberger,
one of today's most noted main-stream economic historians,
places little historical importance on the events in Amsterdam
in 1634-37.

The reason for Kindleberger's slight is found in

the footnote referenced above, in particular:

"... lack the

characteristic monetary features that come with the spread of
banking in the eighteenth century."
chapter

four

expansion.

of Manias, Panics,
He

begins

this

Kindleberger devotes
and Crashes

chapter

with

the

to

monetary

following:

"Speculative manias gather speed through expansion of money
and credit or perhaps, in some cases, get started because of
an initial expansion o f vmoney and credit.

One can look back

at particular manias followed by crashes or panics and see
what went wrong"

(1978, 57).

couple

referencing

of

pages

He then goes on to spend a
various

bubbles

and

ensuing

crashes, all of which were created by monetary expansion.
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However, Tulipmania is not mentioned, for the obvious reason
that Kindleberger does not believe that an expansion of the
supply of money in Amsterdam created Tulipmania.

Later in the

same chapter the Bank of Amsterdam is talked about.

The bank,

at the time of Tulipmania, did not perform credit operations
but only issued notes against deposits of specie.

Thus, it's

highly probable that in Kindleberger's view the supply of
money did not undergo the sudden increase needed to create a
speculative bubble.

But

in fact the supply of money

in

Amsterdam had increased dramatically, and that is where this
author's story of Tulipmania begins.
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CHAPTER THREE

FREE COINAGE. THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM.
AND TULIPMANIA

After the fall of the Roman Empire, many different money
systems prevailed throughout Europe.

Kings were eager to

strike their own gold and silver coins.

These coins were

typically made full legal tender, at a ratio of value fixed by
the individual states.

This supreme right of coinage was

exercised and misused by every sovereign in Europe.

After

the fall of Byzantium, the sacred images which were struck on
most coins disappeared.

These sacred images had kept the

superstitious masses, not to mention states, from altering the
coins. But, without these sacred images, these gold and silver
coins underwent numerous alterations, to the point where it
was difficult to follow either a coin's composition or value.
This "sweating," "clipping," or "crying" of coins continued
right up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, with all
of Europe's various rulers being guilty.

These kings quickly

found that an empty state treasury could be filled by debasing
the currency.
The powerful Charles V was among the most culpable for
alterating the value of money.

These alterations in the

Netherlands came by monetary decree.

In 1524, Charles raised
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the value of his gold coins from nine or ten, to eleven and
three-eighths

times

their weight

in

silver

coins.

This

created immense displeasure throughout the kingdom, so much
that, in 1542, Charles returned to a ratio of ten to one, not
by lowering the value of his gold coins back to their value
before 1524, but by degrading his silver coins.
later,

Four years

in 1546, Charles struck again, suddenly raising the

value of his gold coins to thirteen times the value of silver
coins.

These actions served to first overvalue and then

undervalue gold in relation to its market value to silver1,
with the result being that the overvalued money drove the
undervalued money out of circulation.
known as Gresham's Law.

This phenomenon is

A silver ducat went from 54 grains

fine down to 35 grains fine

(Del Mar

[1895]

1969,

345) .

Thus, with silver coins being the primary circulating medium
of Holland, this action reduced the value of the circulating
money supply by one-third from its value in 1523, and raised
the value of gold nearly fifty per cent.

By this devise,

Charles was able to replenish his dwindling treasury.
This transgression, in 1546, writes Del Mar ([1895] 1969,
348) may have been "the straw that broke the patience of his
long-suffering subjects.,"

A revolution was then sparked in

the Netherlands and although Charles was able to check any
upheaval during his reign, with the accession of Phillip the
Bigot, the smoldering revolutionary fires burst into intense
flames.

After the "Confederation of Beggars" formed in 1566,
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six years later the revolution was proclaimed.
One of the first measures instigated by the revolutionary
government was "Free" or "individual" coinage.

Helfferich

([1927] 1969, 370) explains:
The simplest and best-known special case of
unrestricted transformation of a metal into money
is that known as "the right of free coinage," or
"coinage for private account." The State will mint
coins out of any quantity of metal delivered to it,
either making no charge to the person delivering
the metal, or merely a very small charge to cover
cost. The person delivering the metal receives in
coin from the mint the quantity of the metal
delivered up by him either without any deduction or
with a very small deduction for seigniorage.
The idea of free coinage was brought to the Netherlands
from the Dutch East Indians, who inherited the concept from
the Portuguese.

The practice was originated by the degenerate

Moslem governments of India, and was copied by Mascarenhas in
1555 (Del Mar [1895] 1969, 344-51).
Free coinage was an immediate success.
silver and gold bullion obtained

Possessors of

in America,

"had vainly

sought to evade the coinage exactions of the European princes;
now the door of escape was open; they had only to be sent to
Holland,

turned into guilders and ducats,

and credited as

silver metal under the name of sols banco"

(Del Mar [1895]

1969, 351).
As the seventeenth century began,
driving force behind European commerce.

the Dutch were the
With Amsterdam as

capital of Holland, it served as the central point of trade.
Amsterdam's currency consisted primarily of the coins of the
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neighboring countries and to a lesser extent its own coins.
Many

of these

foreign coins were worn and damaged,

thus

reducing the value of Amsterdam's currency about nine per cent
below that of "the standard" or the legal tender.

Thus, it

was impossible to infuse any new coins into circulation.
the circulation of newly minted coins,

Upon

these newly minted

coins were collected, melted down, and exported as bullion.
Their place in circulation was quickly taken by newly imported
"clipped" or "sweated" coins.

Thus, undervalued money was

driven out by overvalued or degraded money, due to the legal
tender status given these degraded coins (Smith [1776] 1965,
447) .
To remedy this situation,
originated

in

1609.

The

the Bank of Amsterdam was

Bank was

to

facilitate

trade,

suppress usury, and have a monopoly on all trading of specie.
But the bank's chief function was the withdrawal of abused and
counterfeit coin from circulation (Bloom [1937] 1969, 172-73).
Coins were taken in as deposits, with credits, known as bank
money issued against these deposits, based not on the face
value of the coins, but on the metal weight or intrinsic value
of the coins.

Thus, a perfectly uniform currency was created.

This feature of the new money, along with its convenience,
security and the City of Amsterdam's guarantee2, caused the
bank money to trade at an agio, or premium over coins.
premium varied

The

(four to six and one-quarter per cent), but

generally represented the depreciation rate of coin below its
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nominal or face value (Hildreth [1837] 1968, 9).
One

of

the

services

that

the

Bank

provided

was

to

transfer, upon order from a depositor, sums (deposits) to the
account of creditors, by book entry.
banking operation.
withdrawal

This service was so popular that the

of deposits

occurrence.

This is called a giro

from the bank became a very rare

If a depositor wanted to regain his specie, he

could easily find a buyer for his bank money, at a premium,
due to its convenience.

Additionally, there was a demand for

bank money from people not having an account with the Bank
(Clough 1968, 199).

As Adam Smith ([1776] 1965, 447-48)

related in the Wealth of Nations: "By demanding payment of the
bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose this premium."
The

City

of

requirement

Amsterdam's
that

all

guarantee,

bills

drawn

in

upon

addition
or

to

negotiated

the
in

Amsterdam, in the amount of six hundred guilders or more, must
be paid in bank money, "took away all uncertainty in the value
of the bills,"

and thus

forced all merchants to keep an

account at the bank, "which necessarily occasioned a certain
demand for bank money."
Smith

([1776]

1965,

448-49)

goes

on

to explain

the

mechanics of how the Bank of Amsterdam issued bank money.

The

Bank would give credit (bank money) in its books for gold and
silver bullion deposited, at roughly five per cent below the
bullion's then current mint value.

At the same time as this

bank credit was issued, the depositor would receive a receipt

that entitled the depositor, or bearer, to draw the amount of
bullion deposited from the bank, within six months of the
deposit.

Thus to retrieve a bullion deposit, a person had to

present to the bank:

1) a receipt for the bullion,

2) an

amount of bank money equal to the book entry, and 3) payment
of a quarter of one per cent fee for silver deposits, or one
half of one per cent fee for gold deposits.

Should the six

month term expire with no redemption, or without payment of a
fee to extend for an additional six months,

"the deposit

should belong to the bank at the price at which it had been
received,
books."

or which credit had been given in the transfer
Thus the bank would make the five per cent fee for

warehousing the deposit, if not redeemed within the six month
time frame.

The higher fee charged for gold was due to the

fact that gold was thought to be risker to warehouse, because
of its higher value.
to expire.

A receipt for bullion was rarely allowed

When it did happen, more often than not, it was a

gold deposit because of its higher deposit fee.
This system created two seperate instruments, that were
combined to create an obligation of the Bank of Amsterdam.
Smith ([1776] 1965, 450) explains:
The person who by >making a deposit of bullion
obtains both a bank credit and a receipt, pays his
bills of exchange as they become due with his bank
credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt
according as he judges that the price of bullion is
likely to rise or to fall.
The receipt and the
bank credit seldom keep long together, and there is
no occasion that they should. The person who has a
receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds
always plenty of bank credits, or bank money to buy

As
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at ordinary price; and the person who has bank
money, and wants to take out bullion, finds
receipts always in equal abundance.
The holder of a receipt cannot draw out the bullion
for which it is granted, without re-assigning to
the bank a sum of bank money equal to the price at
which the bullion had been received. If he has no
bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those
who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw
out bullion without producing to the bank receipts
for the quantity which he wants. If he has none of
his own, he must buy them of those who have them.
The holder of a receipt, when he purchases bank
money, purchases the power of taking out a quantity
of bullion, of which the mint price is five per
cent, above the bank price.
The agio of five per
cent, therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is
paid, not for an imaginary, but for the real value.
The owner of bank money, when he purchases a
receipt, purchases the power of taking out a
quantity of bullion of which the market price is
commonly from two to three per cent, above the mint
price. The price which he pays for it, therefore,
is paid likewise for a real value.
The price of
the receipt, and the price of the bank money,
compound or make up between them the full value or
price of the bullion.
The same system that Smith describes above, also applied
to coins that were deposited with the bank.
1965,

451)

Smith ([1776]

does assert that deposits of coinage were more

likely to "fall to the bank" than deposits of bullion.

Due to

the high agio (Smith indicates typically five per cent) of
bank money over common coin, the paying of the bank's sixmonth storage fee created a loss for holders of receipts.
The amount of bank money for the which the receipts had
expired,

in relation to the total amount of bank money was

very small.

Smith ([1776] 1965, 451) writes:

The bank of Amsterdam has for these many years past
been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for
which the receipts are very seldom allowed to
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expire
or, as they express it, to fall to the
bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or
of the credits upon the books of the bank, is
supposed to have been created, for these many years
past, by such deposits which the dealers in bullion
are continually both making and withdrawing.
The bank was highly profitable for the city of Amsterdam.
Besides the aforementioned warehouse rent and sale of bank
money for the agio, each new depositor paid a fee of ten
guilders to open an account.

Any subsequent account opened by

that depositor would be subject to a fee of three guilders.
Transfers were subject to a fee of two guilders, except when
the transfer was for less than six hundred guilders.
fee

was

six

guilders

(to

discourage

small

Then the

transfers).

Depositors were required to balance their accounts twice a
year.

If the depositor failed to do this,

twenty-five guilder penalty.

he incured a

A fee of three per cent was

charged if a depositor ordered a transfer for more than the
amount of his account (Smith [1776] 1965, 454).
In the beginning, the Bank of Amsterdam did not perform
a credit function; it was strictly a deposit bank, with all
bank

money

backed

one

hundred

percent

by

specie.

The

administration of the Bank of Amsterdam was the charge of a
small committee of city government officials.
kept the affairs of the bank secret.

This committee

Because of the secretive

nature of its administration, it was not generally known that
individual

depositors

had been

accounts as early as 1657.

allowed to overdraw their

In later years, the Bank also

began to make large loans to the Dutch East India Company and
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the Municipality of Amsterdam.

By 1790 word of these loans

became public and the premium on bank money

(usually four

percent, but sometimes as high as six and one-quarter percent)
disappeared and fell to a two percent discount.

By the end of

that year the Bank virtually admitted insolvency by issuing a
notice that silver would be sold to holders of bank money at
a ten percent discount.

The City of Amsterdam took the Bank

over in 1791, and eventually closed it for good in December of
1819 (Conant [1927] 1969, 289).
The effects of free coinage combined with the stability
of the Bank of Amsterdam, created the impetus that channeled
the

large amounts of precious metals

America,

and

to

a

lesser

degree

in

being discovered
Japan,

towards

in
the

direction of Amsterdam.
After Columbus came to America in 1492 and Cortes invaded
Mexico in 1519, an influx of precious metals began to enter
Europe,

principally

through

Spain.

The

output

of

these

fertile mines in the Americas reversed a trend of lower prices
in Europe that had been caused by the combination of static
metals production in Europe and rapidly expanding industry and
commerce.

Production in the New World was further increased

after the discovery of Peru's Huancavelica mercury mine in
1572.

The amalgamation process which was invented in the mid

sixteenth century depended heavily on mercury.

This process

greatly increased the efficiency of the silver production
process (Hamilton 1929, 436-43).
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The Japanese silver mining industry was also expanding at
the same time, but without the benefit of the mercury-amalgam
process.

The Dutch East India Company had a virtual monopoly

on trade with Japan and of course access to their precious
metals production from 1611 through the end of the century.
Del Mar ([1902] 1969, 307-8) points out that, "from 1624 to
1853 the Dutch were the only Europeans permittedto trade with
Japan...," managing "to obtain about one-half

of the total

exports of the precious metals from Japan."
Flynn (1983, 162, 164) indicates that:
"American output of bullion, in conjunction with
the output of Central European and Japanese mines,
increased the world's supply of silver sufficiently
to slowly drive its market value downward.
That
is, there was
price inflation in the sixteenth
century. American and non-American mines produced
such an enormous quantity of silver that its market
value dropped
to a level
below the
cost of
producing it in a growing number of European
mines."
Francis Walker ([1881] 1968, 135) validates this view: "..the
astonishing production of silver at Potosi began to be felt.
From 1570 to 164 0 silver sank rapidly.

Corn rose from about

two oz. of silver the quarter, to six or eight oz."

Walker

([1881] 1968, 135) goes on to quote David Hume:
By the most exact computations that have been formed
all over Europe, after making allowance for the altera
tions in the numerary value, or the denomination, it is
found that the
prices of all things have risen three,
four, times since the discovery of the West Indies.
The following table illustrates this large influx of
precious metals:
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Spanish Imports of Fine Gold and Silver from America (in
grams)
PERIOD
1503-1510
1511-1520
1521-1530
1531-1540
1541-1550
1551-1560
1561-1570
1571-1580
1581-1590
1591-1600
1601-1610
1611-1620
1621-1630
1631-1640
1641-1650
1651-1660
TOTAL

SILVER

GOLD

148,739
86,193,876
177,573,164
303,121,174
942,858,792
1,118,591,954
2,103,027,689
2,707,626,528
2,213,631,245
2,192,255,993
2,145,339,043
1,396,759,594
1,056,430,966
443,256,546

4,965,180
9,153,220
4,889,050
14,466,360
24,957,130
42,620,080
11,530,940
9,429,140
12,101,650
19,541,420
11,764,090
8,855,940
3,889,760
1,240,400
1,549,390
469,430

16,886,815,303

181,333,180

Source: Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price
Revolution in Spain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1934) (reprinted in Clough 1968, 150)
Bullion flowed from Spain to Amsterdam due to both trade
and seizure of treasure.

As Violet Barbour

(1963, 49-50)

relates:
In 1628 occurred the famous capture of the Spanish
treasure fleet by Piet Heyn, which netted 177,537
lbs. weight of silver, besides jewels and valuable
commodities, the total estimated to come to 11 1/2
to 15 million florins.
More important than such
occasional windfalls was the share of Dutch
merchants in the new silver brought twice a year to
Cadiz from the mines of Mexico and Peru, a share
which represented in part the profits of trade with
Spain and through Spain with the New World.
Just
what that share was from year to year we do not
know.
Only a few fragmentary estimates for nonconsecutive years in the second half of the century
have come to light. According to these the Dutch
usually carried off from 15 to 25 per cent of the
treasure brought by the galleons and the flota,
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their share sometimes exceeding, sometimes falling
below the amounts claimed by France or Genoa:•..
Del Mar ([1902] 1969, 326-7) echos this view:
The honest Abbe Raynal explains the whole matter in
a few words: whilst the Portuguese robbed the
Indians, the Dutch robbed the Portuguese. "In less
than half a century the ships of the Dutch East
India Company took more than three hundred
Portuguese vessels
laden with the spoils of
Asia. These brought the Company immense returns."
Much of eastern gold, which found its way to
Amsterdam was proceeds of double robbery.
Further evidence of an exceptionally large increase in
the supply of money in the Netherlands is provided by an
excerpt from a table of:
Total mint output of the South Netherlands, 1598-1789
(in guilders)
Gold

Silver

Copper

Total

• •
• •

1628-9
1630-2
1633-5
1636-8
1639-41
1642-4

153,010
364,414
476,996
2,917,826
2,950,150
2,763,979
•*

2,643,732
8,838,411
16,554,079
20,172,257
8,102,988
1,215,645

4,109
6, 679
-

47,834

2,800,851
9,209,503
17,031,075
23,090,083
11,053,138
4,027,458

••

(Jan A. van Houtte and Leon van Buyten 1977, 100)
These figures point to the explosive increase in the
supply of money for the time period from 1630-38, the later
part of which, Tulipmania took place (1634-37).
The graph that follows is that of the deposits in the
Bank of Amsterdam.

An exceptional growth in deposits

is

reflected for the period from approximately 1625 to 1650.
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Upon close inspection it appears that from the year 163 3 to
1638 deposits grew from five million florins to eight million
florins, a sixty per cent increase!

Source: J.G. van Dillen (reprinted in Spooner

1972, 68)

As the above evidence indicates, free coinage, the Bank
of Amsterdam, and the heightened trade and commerce in Holland
served to attract coin and bullion from throughout the world.
As Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 351) writes:
Under the stimulus of "free" coinage, an immense
quantity of the precious metals now found their way
to Holland, and a rise of prices ensued, which
found one form of expression in the curious mania
of buying tulips at prices often exceeding that of
the ground on which they were grown.
Del Mar ([1895] 1969, 352) goes on to discuss the end of
Tulipmania:
In 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia acknowledged
the independence of the Dutch republic, the latter
stopped the "free" coinage of silver florins and
only permitted it for gold ducats, which in Holland

had no legal value.
This legislation discouraged
the imports of silver bullion, checked the rise of
prices, and put an end to the tulip mania.
Del Mar concedes in a footnote that the mania had already been
discouraged on April 27th, 1637 by a resolution of the StatesGeneral that canceled all contracts.
The crash of tulip prices left the growers of the bulbs
to absorb the majority of the financial damage of the mania.
With the government basically canceling all contracts, growers
could not find new buyers or recover money owed them by buyers
supposedly under contract.

As Simon Schama (1987, 361-62)

describes:
In any event,the magistrates of the Dutch towns saw
niceties of equity as less pressing than the need
to
de-intoxicate
the
tulip
craze.
Their
intervention was hastened by the urgency of
returning the genie speculation to the bottle from
which it had escaped, and corking it tightly to
ensure against any recurrence.
To some extent,
they could feel satisfied that the ineluctable
operations of Fortuna had already punished the
foolhardy by taking them from rags to riches and
back again in short order.
But they still felt
impelled to launch a didactic campaign in tracts,
sermons and prints against folly, since its special
wickedness had been in leading the common people
astray.
In spite of the short duration of the tulip craze, and
assertions by other authors to the contrary, there is evidence
of financial pain that ^resulted from tulipmania.
depicting the number of annual bankruptcies

A chart

in Amsterdam,

Leiden, Haarlem and Groningen from 163 5-1800, presented by
Messrs.

van Houtte and van Buyten

(1977,

102), reflects a

doubling in the number of bankruptcies in Amsterdam from 163 5

33

to 1637.

It would be hard to imagine that only tulip growers

made up this

increase in the number of bankruptcies.

I

suspect some of the "foolhardy masses" were among this group.
The story of Tulipmania is not only about tulips and
their

price

"fundamentals

movements,
of

and

certainly

the tulip market"

does

occurrence of this speculative bubble.
only

served

as

a manifestation

of

studying
not

the

explain the

The price of tulips
the

end

result

of

a

government policy that expanded the quantity of money and thus
fostered an environment for speculation and malinvestment.
This scenario has been played out over and over throughout
history.

But what made this situation unique was that the

government policy did not expand the supply of money through
fractional

reserve

banking

which

is

the

modern

Actually, it was quite the opposite that occured.

tool.

As kings

throughout Europe debased their currencies, through clipping,
sweating, or by decree, the Dutch provided a sound currency
policy which called for money to be backed one hundred per
cent by specie.

This policy, combined with the occasional

seizure of bullion and coin from Spanish ships on the high
seas, served to attract coin and bullion from throughout the
world.

The end result was a large increase in the supply of

coin and bullion in 1630's Amsterdam.

Free coinage laws

then served to create more money from this increased supply of
coin and bullion, than what the market demanded.

This acute

increase in the supply of money served to foster an atmosphere
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that

was

ripe

for

speculation

and

malinvestment,

which

manifested itself in the intense trading of tulips.
The Bank of Amsterdam,

and the bank money it issued,

served as the inspiration for John Law's early theories on
money.

The early seventeenth century episode in Holland,

known as Tulipmania, was not only a bubble, driven by the same
monetary features as later bubbles, but its catalyst, The Bank
of Amsterdam, served to inspire the man who was to create two
later (and more famous) bubbles, the Mississippi and South Sea
Bubbles.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. The ratio of silver to gold from 1524 to 1546, based on the
average for Europe, fluctuated bteween approxiamately 10% and 11
(Rich and Wilson, eds. 1975, 459).
2. The city of Amsterdam was bound for the coin or bullion's
security while at the Bank, against fire, robbery, or any other
accident.
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CHAPTER FOUR

JOHN LAW. BACKGROUND

Perhaps

no

person

in

the

history

of

economics

has

inspired such strong opinions, both pro and con, as John Law.
Some view Law as a genius.
madman and swindler.

To others he is considered a

In many ways he was all of these things.

Very rarely is an economist presented with the opportunity
that John Law enjoyed.

Typically, the closest an economist

comes to implementing his or her ideas, is by serving in some
advisory capacity to a ruler, president, or governing body.
But even

in this

capacity the

economist's

recommendation

becomes just one of many considerations that the politician or
monarch takes under advisement when setting economic policies.
But Law's situation was much different.

Law himself said,

after his fall, that he had exercised more power than any
other uncrowned individual in Europe.

At the height of his

power, he controlled the Royal Bank (and thus the supply of
money), the public debt, indirect taxes, colonial trade, the
tobacco monopoly, and more than half of what is now the
continental United States.

Additionally, Law was the finance

minister, the main economic advisor, and the favorite of an
absolute prince (Hamilton 1968, 80).
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Because of his power, Law was able to manipulate all
aspects of the French economy, and gave what is now known as
"Keynesian economics,"

its first test.

system ended in disaster.

Ultimately,

Law's

But unfortunately, the mistakes

made by John Law and his immitators in Britian continue to be
made over and over again, to this day.
John Law was born in Edinburgh in 1671, the son of a
goldsmith-banker.
teens.1

Law's father died when John was in his

Law's mother,

a distant relative of the Duke of

Argyll, saw to it that her son received an education in both
theoretical and applied economics.

Mackay indicates that

young John worked for his father for three years, learning the
Scottish banking trade. Law displayed a great aptitude for
numbers, which aided in his quick grasp of the principals of
the banking business.
After the death of his father,
banking business waned.

Law's interest in the

At age seventeen, Law was a strapping

young man who was a favorite with the ladies, in spite of his
face being deeply scared from the small-pox.

The young women

called him, Beau Law, while the men nicknamed him, Jessamy
John, for his foppery.
With young Law receiving an inheritance from his father's
estate, he could afford to take off and see the world.

His

first stop was London, which provided John the opportunity to
profit from certain gambling systems, using his considerable
mathematics

skills.

Law was

the

envy

of

all

the

other
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gamblers,

who afterwitnessing his success, began to follow

his bets.

Law's waywith theladies continued in London, with

John having his choice of the most beautiful.
Law's life of leisure continued for nine years. But by
this time John was addicted to gambling, and he eventually
lost more than he could repay without mortgaging his family
estate.
trouble.

About this same time, Law's love life
While

in London,

Villiers 2, led to

a

a duel with

Villiers, named Wilson.

also created

love affair with Elizabeth
a

jealous

suitor

of Ms.

Law proved to be good with a gun

also, killing Wilson on the spot. Normally this would not have
been considered a grave offense.

However, Wilson had many

powerful friends, which, combined with the fact that Law was
a foreigner, led to Law's arrest and murder charge.

After

being found guilty,

But the

he was

sentenced to death.

sentence was subsequently lowered to just a fine, based upon
the grounds that his offence was only manslaughter.

While

being detained, pending an appeal by Wilson's brother, Law
bribed a guard and escaped to the continent.
offered for Law.

A reward was

Mackay ([1841] 1963, 3-4) quotes the ad in

the Gazette, describing Law:
Captain John Law, a Scotchman, aged twenty-six; a
very tall, black, lean man; well shaped, above sixfeet high, with large pock-holes in his face; big
nosed, and speaking broad and loud.
Mackay speculates that this description was published to
aid Law in his escape, given its exaggerated nature.
Law traveled for three years on the European continent
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studying the monetary and banking matters of the countries he
was in by day, and speculating at the gaming tables by night.
After returning to Edinburgh in 1700, Law began to write
on the subjects of money and trade.

His first pamphlet

entitled, Proposals and Reasons for constituting a Council of
Trade was not well received.
Law went back to the continent after his proposal was
sacked.

More importantly, Law was unable to obtain a pardon

for his murder of Mr. Wilson, thus making life in Scotland
somewhat uncomfortable.

For fourteen years, Law gambled his

way across Europe, supporting himself on gaming wins.

He was

known in gambling halls everywhere as a skilled player.

His

reputation was such that he was persona non grata, in Venice
and Genoa.

The magistrates in those two cities believed him

to be a dangerous influence on youth.

While in Paris, Law

made an enemy of the lieutenant-general of the police, who
eventually told Law to leave town.

However, by that time, Law

had become friends with the Duke de Vendome, the Prince de
Conti, and more importantly the Duke of Orleans.

The Duke of

Orleans and Law shared the preference for social life, and
they frequently ran into each other at social functions.

It

was through the Duke of Orleans that Law would eventually
implement his monetary and financial plans

(Mackay

[1841]

1963, 2-4).
Law submitted a proposal for a privately owned Bank of
France, to Madame de Maintenon, the head mistress of Louis
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XIV,

in 1702.

Part of the introduction of this proposal

included the financial instruments that Law considered part of
the money supply: stock in the Dutch and English East India
companies, exchequer notes, Dutch government bonds, and Bank
of England stock.

Branches of the bank would be located in

each province, with notes payable to bearer being redeemed at
the parent bank in Paris or at any branch.

Through this bank,

Law argued, the supply of money could be increased, which
would lower interest rates and stimulate economic activity.
But the proposal was not accepted, some believe, due to
Law's protestant faith, Louis being a catholic.3
With Scotland in the throws of a depression in 1704, the
Bank of Scotland suspended specie payments.

This development

led Law, who was back in Edinburgh at the time, to make his
land bank proposal to the Scottish Parliament.
proposal

was

published

anonymously

as:

Money

In 1705 this
and

Trade

Considered: With a Proposal for Supplying the Nation With
Money.

Numerous other tracts were written, during that same

period, with each author claiming that a lack of money was the
cause of the crisis.

Law's work, however, went much further

than the others in terms of formulating the theory behind his
proposal.

But again, his work was for naught.

In spite of

support from the Lord High Commissioner, the Earl of Islay,
and the Duke of Argyll, only two Scottish Parliament members
supported the plan (Hamilton 1968, 79).
In 17 06, Law again was in France submitting his "Treatise
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on Money and Commerce" to French finance minister,
Chamillart.

Michel

Hamilton calls this presentation Law's best,

although it has never been published.

Law was told to leave

France, due to his radical ideas, according to Hamilton (1968,
79) , who argues that allegations that Law was banished because
of his gambling prowess are untrue.
Law's next stop was Italy, where in 1711, he presented
his bank proposal, based upon the Bank of England, to Vittorio
Amadeo II, Duke of Savoy.

Although impressed with Law's

intelligence and knowledge, the Duke felt the plan much to
ambitious for his small country.

He urged Law to try the king

of France again (Mackay (1841] 1963, 5-6).
France's new finance minister,

Desmaretz, turned down

Law's proposal yet again in July, 1715.

Desmaretz liked the

plan, but was uneasy about a bank being so dominated by one
man, especially if that man was to be John Law.

But later

that same year, persistence would finally pay off.

Louis XIV

died, and with the immediate heir to the throne being only
seven years old,

Law's

old friend,

the

Duke of Orleans,

assumed the reins of the French government.
Louis had made a shambles of the finances of the country.
France was deeply in debt and on the verge of bankruptcy.
regent

tried

such

odious

tactics

as

a

recoinage,

The

which

depreciated the currency by twenty per cent, and aggressive,
heavy handed attempts at increasing tax collections.
of these tactics worked.

Neither

Rather, they served to incite the
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ire of the populace.
well received.

Thus, when Law presented his plan he was

But while Law was able to garner the Duke's

support for a royal bank, the Council of Finance rejected the
proposal on October 24, 1715. However, this was to be Law's
last

defeat.

Law

altered

the

plan,

making

the

bank

a

privately owned institution, and obtained a charter for the
General Bank in early May, 1716.4
France,

Law was

able to draft the charter document,

subscribed to twenty-five per
Desmaretz's

worst

Being the first Bank of

fears

had

cent
come

of
true,

its
as

stock.
the

and

Alas,

bank

was

completely dominated by Law, possibly more than any bank had
or ever would be dominated by one man in history (Hamilton
1968, 79).

43

CHAPTER NOTES

1. Hamilton indicates that Law's father died when John was age 13,
Mackay indicates that Law was 17.
2. Later she became the Countess of Orkney
3.
Both Mackay and Hamilton make reference to this religious
bigotry. Mackay ([1841] 1963, 5) relates, "The reason given for
the refusal is quite consistent with the character of that bigoted
and tyrannical monarch." He also indicates that it has appeared in
the correspondence of the Duchess of Orleans, Madame de Baviere,
and the mother of the Regent.
4. Hamilton indicates the 2nd of May, Mackay the 5th.
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CHAPTER FIVE

JOHN LAW'S MONETARY THEORIES

John Law's Money and Trade Considered With A Proposal For
Supplying The Nation With Money was published in 1705, and
submitted to the Parliament of Scotland as a solution to lift
that country from the depths of a depression.

Law's solution,

of course, was to create more money.
Law felt that the use of banks was the best method to
increase the quantity of money.

He was especially impressed

with the Bank of Amsterdam, and noted its contribution to the
prowess of the Dutch in their trade and commercial endeavors,
in spite of having no more natural advantages than his native
Scotland.

Law

([1705]

1966,

37)

noted that the Bank of

Amsterdam was a "secure place", and describes its original
intent:
Banks where the Money is pledg'd equal to the
Credit given, are sure; For, tho Demands are made
of the whole, the Bank does not fail in payment.
Law ([1705] 1966, 37) goes on say that unbacked credit was
issued despite the constitution of this bank requiring onehundred per cent backing.
Yet a Sum is lent by the Managers for a stock to
the Lumbar, and 'tis thought they lend great sums
on other occasions.
So far as they lend they add
to the money, which brings a Profit to the Country,

by imploying more People, and extending Trade; They
add to the Money to be lent, whereby it is easier
borrowed, and at less use, and tho none suffer by
it, or are apprehensive of Danger, its Credit being
good; Yet if the whole Demands were made, or
Demands greater than the remaining Money, they
could not all be satisfied , till the Bank had
called in what Sums were lent.
Law ([1705] 1966, 41) goes on to propose that the
conveniences to be gained from unreserved or unbacked money,
were

more

than

equal

to

the

risks

involved.

Those

conveniences being; less interest, more money, and ease of
payments.
Within Money and Trade, Law ([1705] 1966, 51), although
advocating a system of fractional reserve banking, was not
ignorant to its harmful effects.
Raising [debasing] the Money in France is laying a
Tax on the People, which is soon pay'd, and thought
to be less felt than a Tax laid on any other
way.... This Tax falls heavy on the poorer sort of
the People.
In the last half of Money and Trade, Law espouses his
proposal for paper money backed by land.

His view being that

silver was unsuitable to be money because more and more of it
was being produced.

Thus it became less valuable over time.

Law believed that land would increase in value over time, for
the

following

reasons;

because

demand

for

it

increases,

improvements are made making it more productive, it does not
lose any of its uses, and the amount stays the same.
following capsulizes Law's ([1705] 1966, 89) proposal:
The Paper-money propos'd will be equal in value to
Silver, for it will have a value of Land pledg'd,
equal to the same Sum of Silver-money, that it is

The
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given out for.
If any Losses should happen, one
4th of the Revenue of the Commission, will in all
appearance be more than sufficient to make them
good.
This Paper-money will not fall in value as Silvermoney has fallen, or may fall: Goodsor Money fall
in value, if they increase in Quantity, or if the
Demand lessens. But the Commission giving out what
Sums are demanded, and taking back what Sums are
offer'd to be return'd; This Paper-money will keep
its value, and there will always be as much Money
as there is occasion, or imployment for, and no
more.
Law lists the qualities necessary in money as being:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ease of delivery
Same value everywhere
Kept without loss or expense
Divisible without loss
Capable of a stamp
Stable quantity

Law ([1705] 1966, 93) insists that paper money has more
of these qualities than silver.

But should Law have been

comparing the merits of silver vs. paper or silver vs. land?
If the paper money was to be backed by land, could one redeem
their paper for land?
tests.

If so, land itself must pass the above

If not, fiat paper must pass muster.

The following is Professor Murray Rothbard's necessary
qualities for money:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Generally marketable (non-monetary value)
Divisible
High value per unit weight (portable)
Fairly stable supply
Durable
Recognizable
Homogeneous 1

The two

lists are

somewhat more rigorous,

similar,

however

Rothbard's

being

it will be used for the comparison
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between silver vs.

paper and silver vs.

land,

for use as

money.
quality

silver

paper

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

no
yes
yes
no
no
no
yes

non-monetaryvalue
divisible
portable
stable supply
durable
recognizable
homogeneous

land

yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no

As the above reflects, silver passes the test with flying
colors.

Paper and land do not do as well.

When looking at

the paper and land columns, what stands out is that by merging
these two columns, the three NO qualities of land could be
changed to YESes by paper,
changed to YESes by land.

and the four paper NOs can be

It's doubtful that Law went through

this exercise, but his thought process must have been similar.
However, the two cannot be merged.

Paper backed by land,

would have to be redeemable in land.

That forces land into

the qualities of money test, with a predictable outcome.
Although Law spends 120 pages touting land-backed money
in Money and Trade,

this

author

believes that

Law never

intended that paper money would be redeemable in land.

He was

only attempting to build a case for paper money that would
eventually have little or no backing.
toward this direction in later writings.

Law began to move
He moved away from

land and toward paper assets as backing for money, or to serve
as money.
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Antoin Murphy (1991, 1113) has written that Law, between
1707 and 1711, moved away from land bank proposals towards
financial institutions patterned after the Bank of England and
the East India Company.
claims,

Law began to

Instead of land backing financial

see the support being provided by:

"government securities and loans to the private sector, in the
case of the Bank of England, to fixed and working capital
(ships, trading forts, harbours, stock in hand) and government
securities in the case of the East India Company."
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, England was
waging

numerous

borrowing.

This

wars
debt

which
took

it

financed

the

form

of

with
the

continous
government

securities shown on the balance sheets of the Bank of England
and the East India Company.

The Bank, the East India Company,

and later the South Sea Company, all were granted increased
monopoly privileges in either banking or trading for their
part in buying up government debt at lower interest rates.
Through his interest in the Bank of England and the East
India Company, Law expanded his view of what forms money could
take.

As early as 1707, only two years after Money and Trade

was published, Law began to view exchequer bills, bills of
exchange, and tallies as money.

In addition, new money was

being created in the form of shares of stock in the Bank of
England and East India Company.

Murphy (1991, 1114) relates

the following quote from Law in 'Memoire pour prouver qu'une
nouvelle espece de monnaie peut etre meilleure que 1 'or et
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1 'argent'(1707)

page 205.

What approximates most to a new type of money is
the East India Company. The stock of this Company
is divided into shares like that of the bank. They
are traded each day on the exchange and the current
price is published for the public's information in
the gazettes.
As the transfer of these shares is
easy they are given and received in payment at the
price at which they are traded, so that the
merchant or trader with payments to make does not
need to hold money as a reserve.
As part of his
capital is held in the Indies Company he can use
these shares for payment and if difficulties in
exchanging them at that day's market rate all he
has to do is send them to the Exchange and convert
them into specie, but as they are convertible they
will not be refused.
Law believed that this "new" money would rise in value
along with inflation, as opposed to silver specie that would
decline in value as more was discovered or produced.
felt that the exchequer bills and bills of exchange,
silver,

were

subject

to

this

decline

in

value,

Law
like

because

ultimately these instruments would be liquidated for specie.
But Law was beginning to view shares of stock, the way he had
viewed land, as being superior to silver, believing that these
shares could never decrease in value.
In 'Memoire,' Law continued to propose a banking system
based upon his land-bank proposal.

However on a theoretical

level he was beginning to place more emphasis on liquidity.
Murphy writes:
instrument

that

" He was defining
could

be used

as

as money
a medium

any

financial

of

exchange.

Tallies, exchequer bills and bills of exchange were used for
facilitating exchange and so came to be regarded as money by
Law"

(Murphy 1991,

1115).

These

'les credits,'

however,

50

still lacked an attribute that Law was looking for in money;
that of being inflation proof.

Thus,

in Law's mind,

the

shares fit the bill, providing the superior store of value
function that he was looking for.

The capital of the East

India Company was employed in productive activities, not just
money, which provided this inflation protection.

Law wanted

his monetary system to be tied to productive assets.

That was

the case with his land-bank proposal; currency being backed by
the productivity of the land, but now he was extending this
idea to the capital of companies.
The shares of these companies were interpreted as media
of exchange because of their ready marketability and in Law's
view,

a

view

that

tended

to

dismiss

the

downside

risk

associated with shares, were superior stores of value than
money because they were linked to a productive

capital base

(Murphy 1991, 1116).
In 1711, Law was in Italy advising the Duke of Savoy and
preparing a proposal for a bank to be established in that
country.

The proposal was heavily influenced by the structure

of the Bank of England.

Law by that time had dropped the

land-bank plan, and was concentrating on a proposal that would
incorporate the shares of the Bank of England and the East
India Company into the supply of money.

The Bank of England

impressed Law for two reasons; its ability to finance the long
and costly wars England was engaged in, and the way it had
expanded the supply of money so that trade continued to expand
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in the face of the outflow of specie to finance the War of
Spanish Succession.

Murphy (1991, 1117) quotes Law from an

unpublished manuscript in the Archivio di Stato in Turin,
(Mazzo J3 2a Categoria) page 62, which Law wrote and sent to
Amadeus, Duke of Savoy:
The stock of the Indies Company is also divided up
in shares, like that of the Bank.
They are
negotiated and received in payment.
A merchant
with payments to make does not keep large sums in
cash.
He invests a part of his capital in the
Indies Company or in the Bank and gives this
shareholding in payment when he has insufficient
cash.
If there are difficulties with respect to
acceptance he sends them to the stock exchange to
convert them into specie,
but as they are
negotiable they are not refused at the current
market price.
Most people prefer them to specie
because no return is derived from specie until the
occasion arises to use it.
Shares constitute a
value already in use which is productive.
Law

viewed

France's

monetary

crises

(too

problem

little

in

1715

as

money), similar

twofold,
to

that

a
of

Scotland in 1705, but also a financial crises, which stemmed
from excessive war debts.

Law sought to solve this problem by

establishing a sinking fund to pay off a portion of the
government debt and establish a bank to increase the supply of
money.

The bank was to be a joint venture between Law and the

King, who would receive seventy-five per cent of the profits.
Law, in turn, would receive twenty-five per cent.

However,

Law's plan called for the King's profits to be consigned
to repaying France's debt.

Thus,

both problems would be

served; the bank to meet the shortage of money and the king's
profits to pay

off the national debt.

Law was

linking
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monetary policy with financial policy.
Law continued to develop this linkage in the 'Memoire
sur

les

Banques, '

which

authorities in July 1715.

was

presented

to

the

French

Law recommended a credit creating

bank that issued banknotes, like the Bank of England.

Law

also reminded the authorities of the benefits of including
bank shares as part of the media of exchange.

Bank of England

shares at that time were trading at a thirty per cent premium
over their par value.

Law's proposal also included using bank

profits to purchase the Hotel de Soissons, later to be used as
the site for a stock exchange, the bank, and a center for
foreign exchange transactions (Murphy 1991, 1118-19).
Although
authorities,

he

was

repeatedly

rejected

by

the

French

Law continued to write letters to the Regent

espousing his grandiose plans.
more than just his bank.

These plans began to include

Murphy (1991, 1120) quotes Law in a

letter to the Regent as saying:
"But the bank is not the only nor the biggest of my
ideas-I will produce a work which will surprise
Europe by
the changes that it will generate in
France's favour, changes which will be greater than
those produced by the discovery of the Indies or be
the introduction of credit."
From all appearances this "work" Law was referring to was
the inclusion of shares in the supply of money.

Law wrote,

"I will lighten the burden of the King and the
State in lowering the rate of interest on money,
not by legal methods, but by an abundance of
specie.2
The specie which France mints from
bullion taken from the Indies falls and loses its
value in accordance with the quantities brought
into Europe - the credit which I propose to
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introduce will have a more assured value and will
gain 20 and 30 per cent on specie" (Murphy 1991,
1 1 2 1 ).
It

is

clear

through Murphy's

findings

that

Law had

formulated much of what was to be the Mississippi System,
prior to his being granted the charter for the General Bank in
May, 1716.

The following table from Murphy (1991, 1123) helps

to outline how Law used the framework of the Bank of England,
the East India Company, and the South Sea Company to formulate
the Mississippi System.

BANK OF ENGLAND
Assets
Specie Reserves
Gov't Securities
Loans to Private
Sector

EAST INDIA AND SOUTH SEA
COMPANIES
Assets
Liabilities

Liabilities
Shares
Banknotes/deposits

ROYAL BANK
[BANQUE ROYALE]
(Earlier General Bank)

Fixed/Working
Capital
Gov't Securities
Colonial Trading
Privileges

Shares

COMPANY OF THE INDIES
[COMPAGNIE DES INDES]
(Earlier Company of the West)

Assets

Liabilities

Assets

Specie Reserves
Gov't Securities
Loans to Private
Sector

Shares
Banknotes/Deposits

Fixed/Working
Capital
Shares
Colonial Trading
Privileges

Liabilities

MISSISSIPPI COMPANY
Assets

Liabilities

Shares
Specie Reserves
Banknotes/Deposits
Fixed/Working Capital
Gov't Securities
Loans to Private Sector
Colonial Trading Privileges

This combined company served to realize three of Law's
aims;

the

expansion of the

supply

of money,

with

shares

serving as money as well as banknotes and deposits, management
of France's debt, and the development of the real economy.
Law's "success" with his Mississippi System led, not only to
the Mississippi Bubble, but influenced the South Sea Company
in England, and thus aided in the creation of the South Sea
Bubble (Murphy 1991, 1122-23).
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CHAPTER NOTES

1. Rothbard, Murray. "History of Economic Thought" Lecture at the
University of Nevada at Las Vegas. Fall 1990.
2. Law was not referring to metallic specie, but to the new type of
'credit'.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE MISSISSIPPI BUBBLE

John Law began General Bank in May of 1716; a time when
France was economically devastated.

The late 17th century and

early 18th century had been especially cruel to the French
people.

Under the rein of Louis XIV, France had fought wars

virtually in continuum from 1689 to 1713,

first with the

League of Augsburg and then against Great Britain, Austria,
Holland

and

Succession.

parts

of

Spain

in

the War

of

the

Spanish

In addition to the loss of life and

financial costs of these wars, the French suffered through a
famine in 1693 and

1694, the loss of manpower and

skilled

labor resulting from the persecution of the Huguenots, and the
extraordinarily cold winter of 1708-1709.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) was fought
mainly on foreign soil which weighed heavily on the government
treasury, as it financed armies fighting in various theaters
throughout Europe simultaneously.
by

floating

debt,

known

as

This financing was provided

billets de

monnaie.

These

certificates were first issued in 1701 to the owners of old
coin and bullion who were delivering their specie for
recoinage.

But because the Paris mint was so far behind in

striking and delivering new coins, this paper money was issued
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instead.

The ever increasing war needs led to overissue, with

the expected depreciation in their value soon taking place.
The billets de monnaie were made legal tender in Paris to stop
this depreciation.

Additionally,

a royal proclamation was

made on December 26, 1704, calling for 7% percent interest to
be paid on these notes.

Legal tender status was extended to

the provinces on April 12, 1707.
To finance the war, bills were issued on various royal
agencies, adding to the billets de monnaie already in
circulation.

By 1708, the total supply of billets de monnie

had reached 800 million livre tournois

(l.t.).

This large

increase in the supply of debt, which the French government
was obligated to pay interest on, created a tremendous burden.
To alleviate the financial strain, the Controleur General des
Finances, Nicolas Desmaretz, converted the 800 million l.t. in
billets de monnaie into 250 million l.t. of billets d'etat1
and lowered the interest rate on the new notes to 4 percent.
However, taxes could not be paid with these new notes, as was
the case with billets de monnaie, despite both notes being
payable by the government.

This provision served to replace

specie with these new paper notes.
During this period, the French working class continued to
deal in hard-money because both types of billets were issued
in

denominations

too

large

for

wage

payments.

More

importantly, the common man harbored a healthy distrust for
government issued paper money.

In spite of the billets legal
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tender status, Hamilton (1969, 125) indicates that, "sellers
accepted them for goods only at their market value in terms of
specie, which varied from 20 to 50 percent of par."

These

fluctuations in value made both types of billets unacceptable
as mediums of exchange, and created a basic skepticism about
paper money in general.

It was this skepticism that prevented

the establishment of a bank of issue (Hamilton 1969, 123-26).
After the massive military buildup to wage war for the
previous two decades,
dramatic

shift

to

the French economy was to undergo a

peacetime

operations.

To

resist

the

deflationary effects of this change in the economy, Desmaretz
declared

that

money

would

be

gradually

devalued

by

approximately 40 percent from December 1, 1713 to September 1,
1715.

The initial effect on prices was mixed, with lower

prices in Paris, and higher prices in the cities of Marseille,
Toulouse and Bordeaux in 1714.

But by 1715, prices throughout

France had plunged (Hamilton 1936, 51; Hamilton 1937, 444).
Louis

XIV

indebtedness
person.

died

being

In

in

September

3% billion

spite

of

of

1715

livres, or

numerous

taxes

with

livres

per

rigorous

tax
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and

collection, the state could not pay its debts.

France's

France was

technically bankrupt, and was forced to restructure its debt.
This

restructure

was

accomplished

by

a

combination

of

reduction, repudiation and renegotiation.
Philip, Duke of Orleans, came to power after the death of
Louis XIV.

He ruled as Regent of France from 1715 to 1723
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during the minority of Louis XV, who was the great grandson of
Louis XIV.

Philip replaced Controller General, Desmaretz,

with the Duke of Noailles, who was given the unenviable task
of reducing the state's debts.

All of the long-term debt owed

by the government was refinanced,
particularly

the

intermediaries.

Hotel

de

with city

Ville

For a fixed return,

in

Paris,

governments,
acting

as

investors would lend

money to the municipalities, who in turn would lend the money
to the state.

Tax revenues would then be assigned to the

municipalities to pay the interest due the bondholders.
The state was the big winner in these transactions, at the
expense of bondholders.

The state's floating rate debt was

then subject to a Visa2, which reduced the floating debt from
597 million livres to 198 million livres.

This new debt was

in billets d'etat, of which the government issued 250 million
livres,

198 million livres towards

the old debt,

and 52

million livres for its own account.
How the various types of old floating rate debt was
changed into billets d'etat depended, in theory, upon the type
of debt that was converted, whether the owner of that debt was
the original purchaser, or whether the debt was paid for in
cash.

However, there was speculation that the size of the

bribe to the Paris Brothers, who operated the Visa, was the
overriding factor in how much of a particular person's debt
was replaced with the billets.
In addition to the financial destruction imposed by the
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Visa, Noailles established the 'Chamber of Justice' in March
of

1716.

Murphy

(1986,

56-57)

describes

the Chamber of

Justice as follows:
The Chamber of Justice was an extraordinary
commission
established
to
judge
and
punish
financiers and profiteers deemed to have made their
wealth in a dishonest manner at the expense of the
Crown. It was not a new phenomenon— there had been
four Chambers of Justice in the seventeenth century
in 1601, 1607, 1625, and 1661.
They fulfilled a
dual role, providing a blood-letting... and at the
same time holding out hope of raising badly needed
revenue for the Crown.
Under the 1716-17 Chamber
of Justice 8,000 people were investigated with just
over half, 4,410, taxed a total of 220 million
livres. In some less fortunate cases people found
guilty were sent to the galleys, imprisoned, or
locked in stocks and pilloried. Unlike some of the
earlier Chambers of Justice, no one was executed.
As was the case with the Visa, the Chamber of Justice was
not true to its name in doling out tax levies.
with

corruption,

and the wealthy

financiers

favorably at the expense of a less fortunate,

It was rife
were treated
less wealthy

class, who shouldered the brunt of the financial punishment.
This inequities created a rebellion against the Chamber, which
directly affected the collection of these taxes.

Only 95

million livres were actually collected of the 220 million
levied, with the majority being paid in depreciated paper.
Noailles is said to have estimated the effective amount raised
through the Chamber as only 51 million livres.
Like all other odious tax schemes, the Chamber of Justice
combined with the Visa, stifled the French economy.
wealthy

were

not

inclined

to

spend

tightened, and bankruptcies increased.

or

invest,

The
credit

Recognizing the damage
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inflicted by the Chamber, Noailles had it discontinued in
March 1717 (Murphy 1986, 54-57).
John Law obtained an exclusive charter (20 year term) for
the

General

Bank

in May

operations in his home.

1716,

and

the

Bank

began

Law picked the board of directors,

the officers, and its first employees.
speculates that:

soon

"No other national

Hamilton (1969, 145)
bank

in history— not

excepting the Reichsbank under Hjalmair Schacht or the Bank of
England under Montagu Norman— has ever been so completely
dominated by a single man."

The Bank's protector was none

other than Law's old friend, the Duke of Orleans.
In the beginning, Bank notes were to be payable in specie
of the weight and standard of the date.

The Bank was not

subject to taxation, nor were foreigners deposits subject to
confiscation, in the case of war.

Depositors would receive

bank notes on sight for their coin.

The Bank could open

deposit accounts, which could be withdrawn, or through which
an amount could be transferred to an other party, similar to
today's check writing.

Bills and letters of exchange could be

discounted by the Bank.

However the bank was not to engage in

trade, maritime insurance, or commission business.

There was

no limit placed on the number of bank notes that could be
issued by the bank.

It was left to John Law's judgement as to

the amount of banknotes to be in circulation (Davis 1887, 29899) .
On May 20, 1716 the organization of General Bank was
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revealed.

The Bank's capital totaled 6 million livres,

comprised of 1,2 00 shares at 5,000 livres each.

Murphy (1986,

70-71) points out however, that:
The effective capital base of the bank was much
smaller than this due to the fact that only one
quarter of the capital was to be subscribed in
specie money and three-quarters in billets d'etat
(a type of government security).
The billets
d'etat were then at a discount of about 60 per cent
so that the effective amount of capital to be
subscribed was:
Specie
1.5 million
Billets d'etat (4.5 x 0.4) 1.8 million
3.3 million livres
tournois
Thus, at most, the effective capital base of the
Bank would have amounted to 3.3 million livres, but
even then capital was to be subscribed in four
equal installments.
It is believed that only one
instalment was actually paid up so that the General
Bank started its operations with 825,000 livres
(£52,700).
A

tremendous

amount

of

government

debt

remained

outstanding, in spite of the amount lopped off by the Visa of
1716.

It's estimated that, in addition to the abundant amount

of long-term debt outstanding in the form of annuities, some
250 million l.t.

was outstanding

in the

form of billets

d'etat, along with 215 million l.t. more in other obligations
of the state.

With this tremendous amount of debt and only an

undercapitalized bank to work with, John Law needed another
vehicle to lower interest rates.

This vehicle was the Company

of the West, which originated in the summer of 1717.
The idea for the Company of the West came from Le Gendre
d'Arminy,

who was the brother-in-law of financier Crozat.

The idea for the Company of the West came from Le Gendre
d'Arminy,

who was the brother-in-law of financier Crozat.

Crozat owed a large tax liability from the Visa, and wished to
submit his ownership of the Louisiana trade lease as payment
for this tax.

Law made a grand proposal for the Company and

was given permission to sell shares in the company in August
of 1717.

The company issued 200,000 shares at 500 l.t. each,

or a total capitalization of 100 million l.t..

These shares

could only be purchased with billets d'etat, which at the time
where

discounted

between

68

and

72

percent.

Thus,

the

effective capitalization was more like 30 million l.t.
total,

or 150 l.t. per share.

principal

asset was

The Company of the West's

the exclusive trading privilege with

Louisiana, that was granted by the French government.
privilege

was

in

received

in

exchange

for

the

The

company's

conversion of the government's debt into company stock at a
lower interest rate (Murphy, 1986, 71-73).
Initially, General Bank was prudently operated by
Law and his staff.

The banknotes issued by the bank were

fully backed by specie.

During the Bank's first 31 months,

the supply of money in France was increased only 3 percent by
the Bank's notes. The Bank met every obligation on demand and
instilled a great deal of confidence for itself with the
French public.

By this time the operations of the Bank had

expanded outside of Paris into the provinces.

Law persuaded

the Regent to order receivers to accept and redeem Bank notes,
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and further to remit tax receipts to Paris only in notes.
Thus, circulation of the notes became widespread at a much
quicker rate than would have taken place without such coercion
(Hamilton, 1969, 145).

It was Law's view that the power of

the state should be used, if necessary, to force the use of
bank notes, and that these notes should not bear interest, but
be payable at site.

He felt that the payment of interest on

these notes created distrust amongst the people.
On April 10, 1717,

it was decreed that all taxes and

revenues of the State be paid in bank notes and received at
par for that purpose.

It is this date that is recognized as

the first intervention of the state on behalf of General Bank,
although as mentioned above, the provinces had received orders
from the State six months prior to this.

The provinces were

united in their opposition to the use of the bank notes, and
the

Duke

of

Noailles

was

forced

to

follow

up

with

supplementary decrees no less than three additional times,
issued September 12, 1717,

February 26,

1718, and June 1,

1718, before the opposition finally succumbed (Davis, 1887,
303-5).

On December 4, 1718, General Bank formally became

the Royal Bank, although the outstanding stock of the bank
had already been purchased by the government prior to this
date (Hamilton, 1969, 145).
The share price of the Company of the West in May of 1719
was still languishing, selling at a discount to their nominal
issue price of 500 livres per share.

For Law to fully set in
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motion his system,

buying momentum was needed to spur an

increase in the share price.

His first move was to merge the

Company of East Indies and the China Company together with the
Company of the West.

The new company was known as the Company

of the Indies (aka. Mississippi Company). To accomplish this
alliance required funds, to pay off the heavy debt of both the
China and East Indies companies, to outfit existing ships, and
to build new ships.

The Company could then exploit the

colonial trade that was now under its complete control.

The

Mississippi Company then took over the Company of Africa on
June 4th, which required further funding.

To generate the

needed capital, Law proposed issuing 50,000 shares at 500
livres per share, with a premium of 50 livres per share due
immediately.

Parliament refused to approve the issue, but the

Regent stepped

in and unilaterally granted approval by a

decree of council on June 17th.

By this time the price of the

shares had risen to 650 livres, undoubtedly buoyed by the
issue of 159.9 million livres in banknotes by the Royal Bank
in

five

installments,

the

first

in

January

1719

for

18

million, 20 million more in February, two infusions in April
totaling 71.9 million, and 50 million more in June.
Activity in Mississippi Company shares began to pick up,
with Law fueling the fire, by allowing the new issue of 50
million shares to be purchased in 20 monthly installments of
25 livres each.
to wane while

Law did not want interest in the old shares
promoting the new

shares,

thus,

in modern
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parlance, he created a rights issue, whereby only owners of
old shares, called meres, could purchase new shares, called
filles.

For every four old shares owned, an investor could

buy one new share

Murphy (1986, 77-78) explains:

These rights could be sold once they had paid the
premium and the initial instalment (50 livres plus
25 livres). Indeed, a decree of 27 July suggests
that it was only necessary to pay the 50 livres
premium and that the first payment of subscriptions
was deferred till 1 September.
In this way he
maintained interest in the meres, thereby ensuring
that holders such as the Regent and his followers
made significant capital gains, but also provided a
cheap way for others to come into the market by
buying filles through monthly instalments, when
existing holders of old shares decided to realize
some of their capital gains by selling their partly
paid filles. But, above all, Law through the issue
of partly paid shares provided leverage for
investors to make capital gains that were a
multiple of their initial investment. For example,
if shares rose to 1,000 then the holder of a partly
paid fille, assuming he had just paid the 50 livres
premium, could make a profit of 450 livres (1,00050+(25x20) by selling his fille, a profit nine
times his initial investment.
This new marketing ploy allied with the expanded money
supply helped to increase investor interest in the shares of
the Company of the Indies and the share price went over 1,000
in the middle of July.
On July 20, 1719, the Company of the Indies was awarded
the profits of the Mint for a nine year period.

The price to

acquire these profits was 50 million livres, payable over a
fifteen

month

period.

Within

a

week

of

this

latest

acquisition, the Royal Bank was allowed to increase the issue
of

banknotes

by

240

million

livres,

and

220,660,000 livres worth of notes were issued.

on

July

25th,

To enhance the
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12 percent (60 livres) payable in two half yearly payments in
1720.

The very next day after declaring the dividend, Law

floated a new rights issue hoping to raise the 50 million
livres needed to pay for the Mint purchase.

As put succinctly

by Murphy (1986, 78):
Law had moved extremely quickly. He had increased
the money supply and so oiled the speculative
wheels of the stock market, he promised an
extremely
high
dividend
to
increase
the
attractiveness of shares, and he was channelling
more shares on to the market.
This time Law priced the shares at 1,000 livres each,
with the company of course gaining a 500 livre premium on each
share.

To buy these new shares, called petites filles, the

purchaser had to own 4 meres and 1 fille.

The petites filles

were to be paid in twenty monthly installments of 50 livres
each.

To create a sense of urgency, Law only gave investors

20 days to subscribe to these rights.

This stoking of the

speculative fire was not needed, for the share price had moved
over 1,000 livres.

Murphy (1986, 78) draws upon four sources

to construct the following table of Mississippi Company share
prices for a three week period in late July and early August,
1719.3
25 July
29 July ,
1 August
9 August
14 August

1, 300
1,500
2,250
2, 330
2,940

(Piossens)
(Piossens)
(Dutot)
(Giraudeau)
(Giraudeau)

The rise in the share price continued, reaching 5,000
livres in September.

With the public interest in buying the

shares at a fever pitch, Law turned to refinancing more of the
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government debt,

once again Law floated Mississippi Company

shares, in an attempt to lend the King 1.2 billion livres at
a 3 per cent

interest rate.

This new financing was to

refinance France's remaining billets d'etat in addition to
replacing all of the state's rentes, or long-term obligations.
Law made four share issues in the fall of 1719 that
totaled

324,000

shares:

200,000

were

issued

in

late

September, with 124,000 more issued a week later on October
2nd and 4th.

The share price was 5,000 livres, with payment

for the shares to be made in ten monthly installments of 500
livres.

These new shares came to be known as cinq-cents.

These new issues were to raise 1.5 billion livres, an
amount 14 times greater than the total of Law's first three
stock issues combined.
But

only

a

fraction

Law had struck while the fire was hot.
of

this

amount

was

raised,

because

investors who purchased cinq-cents only put up 500 livres to
acquire

their

installments.

rights,

the

rest

to

be

paid

in

nine

In fact if investors were having trouble making

the monthly payments, Law would adjust the payment schedule to
call for quarterly payments.

Law was a master at developing

ways to market the shares of the Company to the general
public.

In addition to the small down payment feature, Law

developed an option market for the shares, called primes, in
1720.

The Royal Bank made

low interest

loans for share

purchases, and the shares were made bearer securities, thus
providing anonymity of ownership.

This later feature was
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important, given the people's memories of the 1716 Visa tax.
But the principal fuel that drove the market was the
continuous increase in newly created banknotes, supplied by
the Royal Bank.
banknotes

had

By the end of 1719, the total amount of

increased to

one

livres,

billion

and

Law,

through his tool, the Royal Bank, was far from finished.
May of

1720,

banknotes were to total

In

2.1 billion livres

(Murphy, 1986, 130-31).
Near the end of 1719, share prices had risen to 10,000
livres, and more than a few investors wanted to sell their
shares and realize their profits in specie.

At this point

the Regent stepped in with various decrees to repress the
attempted realizations.
granted

the monopoly

precious metals.

On December 9th,

for the

refining

the company was

and

separation

of

On December 21st, banknotes were fixed at a

five per cent premium over silver coin.

Silver could then

only be used for payments under 10 livres, with gold to be
used only for payments less than 300 livres.

In addition, all

foreign letters of exchange could only be paid in notes.

"Law

foresaw that, unless he could prevent the circulation of coin,
it would all be quietly remitted across the border"

(Davis,

1887, 434).
On December 30, 1719, the company set the dividend for
1720 at forty per cent on the par value of 500 livres.

Given

a market price of 10,000 livres the dividend amounted to a 2
per cent yield,

or a four per cent yield on the recently
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issued cinq-cents.

The company's income could not have paid

that dividend from current income.

Thus, it is not viewed as

legitimate, but yet another of Law's tools to hype the stock
price.

Still, this dividend was only half the income the

holders of rentes had received from the French government,
prior to being forced to relinquish rentes for shares in the
fact,

many

rentes

holders

company.

In

resisted

the

redemption.

However, Law, upon being named Contoller-General

of France in January 1720, issued an ultimatum that rentes not
redeemed by July 1st would be arbitrarily converted into two
per cent rentes.
As the share price began to wane, Law became determined
to sustain the system by force if necessary.
old gold and silver coins were confiscated.

In late 1719,
On January 20,

1720, a decree was passed authorizing the search of all homes
for concealed coins.

Eight days later it was decreed that

banknotes were currency throughout the kingdom.

The company

was then allowed to search all buildings, with any specie
seized benefiting the informer.

Davis (1887, 43 9) quotes from

Memoires Secrets sur les Regnes de Louis XIV. et de Louis XV.
They excited, encouraged, paid informers.
Valets
betrayed their masters.
Citizen spied upon
citizen.
This made my Lord Stair say that there
could be no doubt of Law's Catholicity, since he
established the Inquisition, after having already
proved transubstantiation by changing paper to
money.
Those who

still

dared to hold on to coin

constant fear, and Law did not stop there.

lived

in

On the fourth of

February it was announced that the wearing of any type of
precious stone was to be prohibited after the first of March,
the penalty being confiscation and a hefty, 10,000 livre fine.
Two days
million

later,
livres

the Royal Bank was allowed to issue 200
in

banknotes,

and

on

the 9th

all

legal

proceedings involving banknotes, which might arise, were to be
brought before

the

Council.

On the 11th, all

"futures"

transactions between individuals were banned, with the company
being

reserved

exclusive

right

to

sell

"futures."

On

February 18th, it was decreed that goldsmiths were forbidden
to manufacture or sell vessels of gold or silver, except for
some articles of which the weight would be specified by the
Regent.

The next day, on February 19th, it was declared that

no person was to have more than five hundred livres in coin in
his possession, and nobody, except goldsmiths and jewelers,
was to have any articles of gold or silver.

It was also

announced that all payments of 100 livres and greater were to
be made in banknotes,

and all creditors of the State were

ordered to be paid immediately.
Royal Bank was absorbed
February 22nd.

by Company of the

Indies on

John Law had the printing presses working full

time to keep up with his>ambitious banknote issue.
printers and clerks could not keep up.

Still the

Engraved notes were

abandoned, and more clerks were designated to sign the notes.
In the case of ten livre notes, so many had been created that
many were issued without signature.

These lax procedures
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created mistrust on the part of the public.

To regain the

appearance of conservatism, it was decreed that no more notes
would

be

issued,

except

by

decree

at

a meeting

of

the

shareholders of the company (Davis, 1887, 436-41).
At the same meeting,

in which it was decreed that the

Royal Bank would be merged with the Mississippi Company, a
number of other important measures were instituted.

The King

ceded to the Company his 100,000 shares in the company and in
return, he was credited with a 300,000 livre deposit at Royal
Bank and the Company also committed to pay him 5 million
livres a month for ten years.

The total compensation was 900

million livres, or 9,000 livres per share.

This was close to

the then market price of 9,545 livres on February 22nd.
share price had peaked on January 8th at 10,100 livres.

The
Thus

Law was able to cash out the King very close to the market
top.
At this same meeting, Law announced the closing of the
Company's office for the purchase and sale of shares.

Prior

to its closure, this office had supported the share price of
the Company at a high level.

Murphy (1986, 132) explains the

purpose of the office:
Ostensibly this was to bring some order to the
market and prevent transactors being duped by some
of the 'sharks' who frequented the rue Quincampoix
where the shares were traded. In reality it was to
provide official support for the share price to
prevent it falling below a certain minimum floor
price.
This policy had monetized the Mississippi
shares and greatly expanded the liquidity of the
economy.
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These measures combined to produce a precipitous decline
in the price of the company's shares.

Within a week, the

price fell from 9,545 livres to 7,825 livres, a 26 per cent
decline.

Law had anticipated that there would be a movement

out of shares and banknotes into specie, and had prepared for
this event with his decrees of early February.

On February

25,

raising the

Law announced an augmentation of specie,

louis-d'or from 25 to 30 livres and other coins pari passu.
Murphy (1986, 137) speculates that:
This augmentation was meant to signal to the
market that a diminution of specie was imminent,
The message to specie holders was clear-move out of
specie and into banknotes as specie would be worth
less in terms of the money of account once the
diminution was announced.
Two days later Law repeated the decree that prohibited a
person to hold more than 500 livres in coin (Davis,
440).

1887,

Thus the Bank could then refuse to convert more than

500 livres for any one person, and have the law to point to.
Law had thus given people two choices as to what form their
wealth could be in, banknotes or shares.
On the fifth of March, Law announced several policies,
the first was to reopen the office that bought and sold the
company's shares.

This office was now known as bureau de

conversions, and was buying Mississippi Company shares at a
guaranteed price of 9,000 livres.
again monetize

the

company's

This measure served to

shares.

Davis

(1887,

explains:
With a fixed price attached to them, they became at

444)
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receivable in payment of taxes, they were not made
a legal tender, but they were convertible at will
at a fixed price into bank-notes which fulfilled
those purposes.
Dutot calls attention to that
phase of this decree.
He says they-the shares"became proper to fulfil the uses of money."
Next another augmentation of the coin was announced.
Louis-d'or went from 36 livres to 48 livres, and the ecu was
raised from 6 to 8 livres. This augmentation foreshadowed an
impending diminution of specie against banknotes at the Bank.
It was also ordered that all bank loans would be called at
maturity.

As Davis (1887, 44 3) indicates:

"This order was

peremptory, and the inference is unavoidable that the bank had
no other business than loans on margins."
Within a week, on March 11th, a series of diminutions was
decreed.
specie.

These

diminutions

were

intended

to

demonetize

Gold was to be demonetized by May 1, with the silver

marc to be demonetized in monthly diminutions from 80 livres
to 30 livres,

by December 1720.

It is clear that Law's

intent was to have only two circulating mediums in France,
banknotes and Mississippi Company shares, both of which were
under his control (Murphy, 1986, 138).
The decrees of March 5, 1720 have been viewed differently
by various writers.

Davis (1887, 445-46) summarizes these

views:
According to Daire, it was the keystone of the
system, and fully realized Law's economic thought.
It transformed the bank into a reservoir of the
circulating medium, which the paper of the Company
of the Indies would keep at any height, since it
served both as feeder and outlet.
Should money
become too abundant, it would find its way to the
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bank for conversion into shares.
Should the
reverse be the case, shares would be converted into
notes. Dutot says the decree was a mortal blow to
the system. Law was confronted with the necessity
of sustaining either notes or shares, but was
unable to protect both.
Shares at the time
represented more than fourfold the value of the
notes, and he chose the shares.
In taking this
step, Dutot thinks a mistake was made.
Law was
responsible for the notes; but Dutot does not think
him responsible for the speculation, intimates that
the regent must be held responsible for the decree,
and says that it was counselled by enemies of the
system.
Forbonnais says the decree absolutely
decided the fall of the system.
He thinks the
purpose was to sustain the promised dividend by
absorbing into the treasury shares on which the
dividend would then not have to be paid, and that
Law was
attached to the principle
of the
multiplication of wealth, and believed that the
shares would assume the property of money in
circulation. Louis Blanc denounces the decree as a
crime, which has unjustly been imputed to Law, and
believes it was issued in the interest of the
Court.
The decree announcing that no more shares
would be bought and sold saved the system by
ruining several great lords. The decree of March 5
saved several great lords by ruining the system.
However, the decree of March 5th was not the last "shoe
to drop."

That distinction could possibly be assigned to the

decree of May 21st, which Murphy (1986, 148) describes as "the
Beginning of the End."

The following table from Murphy

(1986, 148) outlines the phased price reductions of shares and
banknotes set forth in the decree of May 21st.
Shares.

Prior to decree
21 May
1 July
1 August
1 September
1 October

9, 000
8,000
7,500
7, 000
6, 500
6, 000

Banknotes

10,000...100
8 ,000 ... 80
7,500...75
7,000...70
6,500 ... 65
6,000 ... 60

Reductions in
Silver
11 March Decree
80
65(1
55
50
45
40
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1 November
1 December

5,500
5,000

5,500...55
5,000...50

35
30

By this decree, Law was acknowledging that his decree of
March 5th, guaranteeing the 9,000 livre price of the shares
and at the same time stipulating that silver's value would be
diminished in phases, could not be sustained.

Murphy (1986,

156) explains in a footnote that:
Law argued that as silver was to be reduced from
80 to 30 it was illogical to hold that shares and
banknotes
should
not
be
reduced
also....In
retrospective comments on the System he argued that
he wanted to make such reductions in March but had
been prevented from doing so by vested interest
groupings.
This comment adds credence to Louis Blanc's view that the
system was sacrificed for the benefit of political insiders.
As quoted by Murphy (1986, 149), Law admitted to the public:
"It was necessary to fix a just proportion betwixt the bank
bills and the specie, therefore we were forced to deviate from
the former proportion, without which, the actions and bank
bills must unavoidably have lost their credit."4
As

much

as

Law

had

hoped

to

drive

specie

out

of

circulation, by the use of both market incentives and heavy
handed coercion, the French public could not be completely
persuaded of Law's view that paper money was better than gold
and silver.

The decrees of March,

1720 had but slight

success in attracting specie to the Royal Bank.

By May 21st,

with the public holding 2.1 billion livres in banknotes and
another 600 million livres at the bank or about to printed,
the Royal Bank's specie holdings amounted to only 21 million
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livres in silver and 28 million in gold.
For the investing public, Law's decree of the 21st, cast
a cloud of doubt over what was supposed to be an infallible
system.

Now

all

of

a

sudden,

diminution similar to specie.

shares

were

subject

to

The public outcry forced Law's

friend, the Regent, to demote Law and place him under house
arrest.

The once revered Law, along with his system, were now

despised, and on May 27th, the Regent attempted to stem the
negative tide by revoking the May 21st decree.

Two days

later, he announced further, an augmentation of specie along
with rescinding the prohibition on the holding of gold and
silver.
In spite of the system now being in shambles, Law was
reappointed

to

a

lesser

position

within

the

government,

Intendant General du Commerce, and was reaffirmed as director
of the Royal Bank.

Law attempted to keep the system afloat

through the end of 1720, but the public did not fall for any
more of Law's financial razzle-dazzle.
from

Murphy

(1986,

151)

shows

the

The following listing
downward

trend

in

Mississippi Company share prices from June through November of
1720.
June
July
August
September
October
November

High
6,350
5,403
4,724
5,13 3
5,167
3,967

Low
4,517
4,450
4,367
4,167
3,200
3,300

Although share prices declined, they did so gradually,
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which is a departure from other bubbles, where asset prices
typically break sharply.

Murphy (1986, 152) explains:

However, there is an explanation for the gradual
collapse in the price of Mississippi shares, a
phenomenon not mirrored by the collapse of the
South Sea scheme where the fall in the price of
shares was sharper and more sudden.
In France
large quantities of specie had been withdrawn from
circulation, through Law's measures and hoarding on
the part of the more perspicacious public.
Most
wealth holders
in France faced the classic
Keynesian
two-asset
choice,
that
is money
(banknotes) or bonds (shares of the Mississippi
Company).
The price of shares did not collapse
because French investors were locked in to holding
either shares or banknotes. At times the price of
shares rose because investors felt marginally more
confident about them than about holding banknotes.
The way to truly gauge the affects of the excessive money
creation by Law, is to look at the French exchange rate, which
sank from 20 pence sterling in May to 6 pence in September,
and was so low it was not quoted for the last three months of
It was the livres plunge against the pound sterling

1720.

that is the manifestation of the bursting of the Mississippi
Bubble.

The

following

outline

from

Murphy

(1986,

152)

juxtaposes this exchange rate relationship with Mississippi
share prices in both livres and sterling for selected months
in 1720.
January March
Mississippi share
prices (livres)

9,085

Exchange rate pound
sterling/livres
Mississippi share
price in sterling

(1/2)

May

9,000 9,018

July

September

4,895

4,367

30.0

32.3

39.3

50.7

92.3

£302

£279

£229

£97

£47

While the drama of this boom and subsequent bust was
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being played out, what was the effect upon the lives of the
French working class?

As is the case with all government

created monetary schemes that expand the supply of money,
money is not spread equally over the populace; certain groups
gain access to the money,

i.e., government,

borrowers, and

speculators, while other groups, such as, the working class,
elderly, and savers are excluded.
Hamilton (1936, 50-54) has developed index numbers to
represent; commodity prices, money wages, and real wages in
Paris during John Law's system.
a

composite

materials,

of

food,

raw

The commodity price index is

materials,

and household staples.

wholesale

However,

building

articles with

l!sticky" prices, such as bread and salt, were omitted.

The

money wage index is comprised of only daily wages of skilled
and common labor, and excludes salaries.

It is Hamilton's

intention that, "the present index numbers presumably do not
underestimate

the

rise

of

prices

and

wages

during

the

Mississippi Bubble."
To gain a sense of the effects imposed upon the French
populace from the tremendous increase in the supply of money,
we shall juxtapose these indexes at selected months in the
Mississippi Bubble story.
May
1716
Commodity Prices 100.7
Money Wages
102.7
Real Wages
101.4

Dec.
1718

July
1719

Jan.
1720

May
1720

Sep.
1720

Dec.
1720

112.1
102.7
89.4

116.1
125.8
113.7

171.1
125.8
74.4

189.7
141.2
75.3

203.7
161.9
84.8

164.2
118.1
82.5

The selection of the above dates was not random, each date has
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a significance, listed below.
May
1716 -General Bank is chartered
Dec.
1718 -General Bank becomes Royal Bank
July
1719 -Royal Bank expands banknote issue by 221m
Jan. 1720 - Company share price peaks at 10,100
Mar. 1720 - Law's diminution of silver
May
1720 - Law's diminution of banknotes and shares
Sep. 172 0- Paris price index peaks
Dec. 1720 - Law's system falls apart
The

above

indexes

prices and wages.

illustrates

the

disparity

between

As prices continued to spiral upward,

wages, although increasing a certain sporadic intervals, never
kept pace with prices.

Included in the above price index, is

building materials, which experienced the largest percentage
increase of any of the goods included in Hamilton's index for
the year 1720.
the

supply

As is the case with many modern increases in

of money,

construction

growing at a frantic pace,
materials.

activity

in Paris

was

doubling the cost of building

The following year, after the bubble's collapse,

three-quarters of this gain was lost (Hamilton, 1936, 65-66).
The boom and bust was not confined to Paris.

Hamilton

(1937, 441-61) has compiled wage and price indices for three
cities

in

southern

France

during

the

Mississippi

period; Marseille, Toulouse and Bordeaux.

Hamilton

Bubble
(1936,

455-56) summarizes his findings:
From June to October 1720 prices advanced 36 per
cent, at Bordeaux, 47.2 per cent, at Toulouse, and
12.3 per cent, at Marseille....
At their highest points, in October, prices at
Bordeaux were twice as high, and at Toulouse 2.4
times as high, as the respective averages in 17161717.
Owing to the catastrophic pestilence that
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ravaged Provence in the late spring and summer of
1720, the peak at Marseille, reached in September,
was 2.7 times as high as in the base period.
In
their apogee, in September, commodity prices at
Paris stood only 2.04 times as high as in 1716-17.
Concerning wages, unfortunately an acceptable wage series
could not be found for Bordeaux,

but Hamilton was able to

secure financial records for Marseille delineating wages for
seven different classes of labor, and wages for four different
grades of labor in Toulouse.

Wage rates in both cities,

fluctuated moderately between the years 1711 through 1718.

As

Law's system began to take shape in earnest, in 1719, wages
moved up sharply in the second quarter,
behind prices.

but still lagged

As the system collapsed in the fourth quarter

of 1720, real wages at Toulouse stood at 82.2, and 87.8 at
Marselle,

reflecting the same phenomenon as that in Paris.

Wage increases were always a step behind commodity
increases.

price

In the systems aftermath, wage-earners

continued to be decimated in Toulouse, as the real wage index
sank to 76.3 in the third quarter of 1721.
at

Marseille,

due

to

the

plague's

This did not occur
decimation

of

the

population, thus making labor scarce. Real wages began to rise
in 1721 and continued through 1725 (Hamilton, 1937, 459).
By all measures, John Law's money machine was to spell
disaster for the French working class, whether they lived in
Paris or in the provinces.

As Hamilton (1937, 461) states,

"Law's System was a catastrophe to the labouring class."
As we recount the story of John Law's Mississippi System
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and its eventually collapse, it is clear that Law was a man
very much ahead of his time.

He created a bank which in many

ways could be considered the prototype of modern central
banks.

Through the vehicle of the Royal Bank, Law created

paper money out cf thin air and tried in vain to escape the
confining clutches of gold and silver specie, a struggle that
has been taken up by subsequent inflation mechanics

from

Benjamin Strong and Montague Norman to Alan Greenspan.

The

following quote from Law (Murphy 1986, 129) sums up his view:
An abundance of money which would lower the
interest rate to 2% would,
in reducing the
financing costs of the debts and public offices
etc. relieve the King. It would lighten the burden
of the indebted noble landowners.
This latter
group would be enriched because agricultural goods
would be sold at higher prices.
It would enrich
traders who would then be able to borrow at a lower
interest rate and give employment to the people.5
Law's theories were virtually a blue print for Keynesian
economics, as Murphy (1986, 129) says, "Keynes can be termed
as post-Lawian!"
Salerno

(1991,

15)

quotes

Rist's

([1940]

1966,

critical summary of Law's ideas:
Law's writings . . . already contain all the ideas
which constitute the equipment of currency cranks—
fluctuations in the value of the precious metals as
an obstacle to their use as a standard . . . the
ease with which they can be replaced by paper
money, money defined simply as an instrument of
circulation (it's function of serving as a store of
value being ignored), and the conclusion drawn from
this definition that any object can be used for
such an instrument, the hoarding of money as an
offence on the part of the citizens, the right of
the government to take legal action against such an
offence, and to take charge of the money reserves
of individuals as they do of the main roads, the

65)
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costliness of the precious metals compared with the
cheapness of paper money . . . .
Given

modern

central

bankers

and

their

respective

government's willingness, if not eagerness, to reach for the
easy-money

tonic

to

revive

an

ailing

economy,

it

is

no

surprise that an over-indebted Britain turned to John Law's
medicine in 1720.

The manifestation of Britain's financial

chicanery is known as the South Sea Bubble, which had its
origins with the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, an
institution that Law sought to emulate with his Royal Bank.
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CHAPTER NOTE8

1. Hamilton describes these financial instruments as equivalent to
treasury bills.
2. Agency in charge of cancellation or repudiation of debt.
3. Piossens, Memoires de la regence de S.A.R. le Due d'Orleans
durant la minorite de Louis XV roide France (I729),ii., Dutot,
Reflextions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (1738);
Giraudeau, Bibliotheque de 1'Arsenal, Paris, MS 4061.
This
manuscript is also to be found in the Bibliotheque Mazarine (MS
2820) and the BN (MS 14092)
4. Murphy quotes Law from, The Present State of the French Finances
(London, 1720), p. 105.
5. John Law, Euvres completes, ed. P. Harsin (Paris, 1934; reprint
Vaduz, 1980), ii. 307, 'Memoire sur les banques'. (translation)
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SOUTH SEA BOBBLE

Late seventeenth century England was a time of increased
trade,

industrial expansion,

and, of course, war.

All of

these elements created the need, at least in the minds of the
British, for a public bank.

England's close relations with

Holland during this period gave the British a first hand view
of the vast Dutch economy, and the important centerpost for
that economy,

the Bank of Amsterdam.

In fact,

after the

founding of the Bank of Amsterdam in 1609, other public banks
began to be
Middelburg,

formed:

local banks

at Rotterdam,

the Bank of Hamburg in 1619,

Sweden in 1656.

Delft

and

and the Bank of

English merchants began to be exposed

to public banks through out Europe, and thus various proposals
began to surface for a public bank in England.
But it was the British government that had the greatest
need for a public bank.

William, when he came to the throne,

hoped to gain popularity by abolishing the hearth tax.1 But,
needing money to fight the war against France, in addition to
the civil war in Ireland and Scotland,

William imposed a

series of other taxes: the poll tax, stamp tax, window tax,
land tax,
bachelors,

and taxes on pedlers,
marriages

and

hackney coaches,

burials.

As

is

births,

inevitable,

86

government revenue was not increased in the same
proportion as the the increase in the tax levies.

Even if the

taxes had all been collected, the war expenses were far in
excess

of

the

highest

revenue

potential

of

the

taxes

(Andreades [1909] 1966, 55-56).
Parliment made provisions allowing tallies to be issued
on future sources of government tax revenue.

At first these

orders were issued against the proceeds of specific taxes.
But the government then began to issue against revenue in
general.

These tallies were made assignable and eventually

the majority of this government debt was held by England's
goldsmith-bankers.
In December of 1671, the King was in need of funding to
finance his Navy.
they refused.
prohibit

He called upon the bankers for help, but

After a debate in Council, the King decided to

certain

payments

out

of

the

Exchequer.

His

proclamation of January 5, 1672 has come to be known as the
"Stop of the Exchequer."

The Stop allowed the King to pay

who he wanted to, with others being out of luck.

Horsefield

(1982, 513) quotes two items in the proclaimation that allowed
for the King's payment discretion: "all other public services
and support of the government" as well as "all other payments
appointed by Warrant under the Privy Seal or Royal SignManual."

The second item enabled the King to direct payments

even on stopped funds.

Not surprisingly, payments continued

to flow to areas of the government.

The most serious losses
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were absorbed by the goldsmith-bankers.

With the government

not making payments on their tallies, bankers were in turn
forced to stop payment.

Although Charles told the bankers to

make payment to their customers, the banks did not have the
money to do so.
The Stop was originally to only last for one year, but
was continued until January 1674.

But by that time the damage

had been done, as Horsefield (1982, 514) indicates: "By then
the

funds

expended,

on

which

the

orders

had

been

drawn

were

so in practice the Stop became permanent."

immediate

effect

evaporated.

of

the

Stop

was

that

credit

The

quickly

The goldsmith's notes became worthless,

subsequently many goldsmith-banks folded.

all

and

The long-

reaching effect of the Stop was the postponment of joint-stock
banking for ten to fifteen years (Horsefield 1982, 511-28).
After the Stop, the King had difficulty borrowing money.
Thus, the British government needed a bank, and of the many
schemes proposed, the one advanced by William Paterson had the
most promise.

Paterson is described by Giuseppi (1966, 9) as,

"one of those men whose ideas range some years ahead of their
time and who have a streak of the true visionary about them,
but never quite reaches, genius."

Paterson and the spokesman

for his fiancial backers, Michael Godfrey, took their plan for
a

'Bank of

England'

to

Charles Montague,

a Lord

of

the

Treasury who subsequently, in 1694, became Chancellor of the
Exchequer.

Paterson's financial backers were all men of great
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substance, influencial politically and all Protestants.
In spite of such backing, the plan was vigorously debated
upon reaching parliament for approval.
the

Bank's

government,

operation

would

greatly

The Tories feared that
strengthen

the

Whig

while the goldsmiths and money lenders feared

being demolished.

Also, some merchants worried that the Bank

would pose a threat to their trade business, and there were
even some Whig supporters who feared that the Bank of England
would

make

Parliment.

the

monarchy

financially

independent

of

the

Prior to the proposal reaching Parliment, there

were concerns within the government about the scheme, most
prominently,

the note

issue.

Paterson and his promoters

recognized the tremendous profit potential from note issue, by
expanding on what goldsmiths were enjoying on a local basis.
The government took a dim view of the bank encrouching on its
domain - the manufacture and control of England's currency.
Paterson's first proposal was denied by Parliment because
as Clapham (1966, 16) says: "It looks as though they thought
the proposal was for the issue of legal tender bank notes; and
apparently that is what it was."

Paterson quickly formulated

a second proposal, which made no mention of bills, except in
clause 28 of the Act, which was added to the original draft in
a seperate schedule.

Clapham (1966, 17) makes the comment

that, "the clause looks like an afterthought."

This proposal

was brought before the Cabinet by Montague, who submited that
£1,200,000 be raised,

which in turn would be lent to the
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Government

at

8 per

cent,

under

subscribers be incorporated and that

the

condition

that

the

£4,000 a year go towards

their management expenses.
Paterson's scheme was debated at length by the Cabinet.
Finally, it was agreed that a bill containing the proposal
should be put before Parliment, where it was passed after
being adroitly attached to an ordinary finance bill.

The act

was was not known as the Bank of England act, but as:
An Act for granting to their Majesties several
Rates and Duties upon Tunnage of Ships and Vessels,
and upon Beer, Ale and other Liquors: for securing
certain Recompenses and Advantages, in the said Act
mentioned, to such persons as shall voluntarily
advance the Sum of £1,500,000 towards carrying on
the War against France.
Thus, the Bank in its early years was called the "Tunnage
Bank."

On April 25, 1694, the Act received the Royal Assent,

and subscriptions for £1,200,000 of the £1,500,0002 began to
be taken.

Opponents of the Bank attempted to postpone the

commission,

but

the

Queen

squelched

the

antagonists

immediately.

William, plain and simple, needed the money to

fight France.

The subscription books were opened at 'Mercer's

Chappell' on June 21st, with £300,000 being subscribed the
first day.

The entire

£1,200,000 was completed by July 2nd.

The first subscribers were the King and Queen for £10,0003,
followed

by

1,267

individual

holders.

Subscribers

were

required to pay 25 per cent of their subscribed amount in cash
(Giuseppi 1966, 11-12).
As remarkable as the speed of filling the subsciption
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was, is how quickly the subscription's full sum made its way
into the Exchequer.

The Bank had promised to complete the

operation by January 1, 1695, but full funding was in fact
completed by mid-December.

Clapham (1966, 20) indicates that:

"This had been done while its capital, nominally of the same
amount, was still only 60 per cent paid up; and even some of
this

£720,000 existed in the form of subscribers bonds which,

rather sanguinely, were 'reckoned as cash'."
The

Bank

aggresively

sought

deposits

from

its

very

beginning, devising three "methods in keeping running cash."
These methods are described by Clapham (1966, 21):
..by "Notes payable to Bearer, to be endorsed", by
"Books or Sheets of Paper, wherein their Account to
be entered", or by "Notes to persons to be
accomptable".
The third method is a kind of
deposit receipt, as is shown by an August decision
that only "accomptable notes" be given for foreign
or inland bills of exchange until "the mony be
actually received". The second method anticipated
the modern pass-book: it blended with the third
under a rule by which people who drew notes
(cheques) should have receipts for their deposits
"and ye particulars of the Bills drawn are to be
entered on ye side". It is the first method which
produced those bearer notes "without which the Bank
could hardly have carried on business"; and the
third from which the cheque developed, for the
holder of an "accomptable note" could create "drawn
notes" against it, for himself or others.
The
limited

Bank

of

England's

note

issue monopoly was

only

by the formal order that prohibited it from issuing

notes in amounts exceeding its capital.

However, as early as

1696, critics of the Bank complained of the free use of notes.
Clapham

(1966,

22)

quotes

from

a

broadsheet

issued

in

connection with the recoinage of 1695-6 entitled The Mint and
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Exchequer united:
the Bank was limited by Act of Parliment not to
give out Bills under the Common Seal for above
£1,200,000; and if they did every Proprietor was to
be obliged. .. to make it good, so that they give
out Bank Bills with interest for but £1,200,000.
But they give the Cashier's notes [observe the term
he uses] for all sums (ad infinitum) which neither
charge the Fund nor the Proprietors, which seems to
be a Credit beyond the intention of the Act...and
never practiced before by any Corporation, and
almost a Fraud on the Subject.
In spite of frequent attacks, the Bank prospered.
promoters

were

all

influential

Whigs,

which

Its

ensured

the

support of both the government and the commercial world, both
of

which

would

threatened.

run

to

the

Bank's

aid

whenever

it

was

This success was reflected in the price of the

Bank's stock which hit the unprecedented price of 108 in
January, 1696.

But two dangers loomed on the horizon: the re

coinage and the Land Bank project.
England's coinage was depreciating daily as a result of
continual clipping and other debasement, i.e., iron and copper
coins being silvered over.
trade

was

at

a

The situation was so severe that

standstill,

attracting

the

attention

Parliment, which passed the Re-Coinage Act of 1696.

of

This act

forbade the exchange, sale or receipt of any coins, clipped or
unclipped, gold or silver, for more than their nominal value.
Additionally, the law called for a £500 fine for anyone caught
in possession of coin clippings, plus the offender would be
branded on the right cheek with a capital R.

And, if this was

not enough, only professional goldsmiths were allowed to buy

or sell bullion.

Any house suspected of containing bullion,

could be inspected at any time.

If bullion was found on the

premises, the owner was required to prove that the bullion was
not the product of clippings or melted coin.

County sheriffs

were required to pay £40 to anyone who procured the conviction
of a clipper.
to

snitch

The law went even further to provide incentives

on

a person's

bullion

holding

neighbor.

Any

"clipper" who was able to secure the guilt of two other
"clippers"

would

receive

a

pardon,

and

the

ambitious

apprentice who informed on his master was made a freeman of
the City.
harshest
protest.

This "war on clipping" which ultimately led to the
of penalties,

execution,

inspired the

clergy to

Two difficulties that the Exchequer was forced to

grapple with concerning the Re-coinage Act were the expense of
the

re-coinage

and more

importantly,

the

decision

as

to

whether the coins should keep their old standard or be issued
at a lower one.
The expense of the operation totaled £2,703,164 and was
covered with difficulty.

This ultimate cost was far in excess

of that estimated in the beginning.

The Bank also was naive

about the consequences of the re-coinage, as Andreades ([1909]
1966, 99) writes:
Possibly too,
if the Bank had realized the
difficulties
it would have
to
face
- the
depreciation of its stock and notes, the suspension
of payments and of dividends - its directors, in
spite of their courage and intelligence, would have
refused to enter upon such a formidable adventure,
more especially since they were already threatened
by the Land Bank, ...

93

The question of whether the new coins should keep their
old standard or be issued at a lower one was to be debated
vigorously.

William Lowndes, the Secretary of the Treasury,

developed the idea that lowering the standard of fineness of
the coins while continuing to call the coins by their former
names, would defray the expense of the re-coinage.

Lowndes'

report was met with a crushing rebuttle from John Locke, who
is quoted by Andreades ([1909] 1966, 101):
But this, however ordered, alters not one jot the
value of the ounce of silver, in respect to other
things, any more than it does its weight, this
raising being but giving of names at pleasure to
aliquot parts of any piece.
No human power can
raise the value of our money their double in
respect of other commodities, and make that same
piece or quantity of silver, under a double
denomination, purchase double the quantity of
pepper, wine, or lead, an instant after such
proclamation, to what it would do an instant
before.4
In spite of Lowndes'

suggestion being the prevailing

view, Montague's support, combined with Locke's keen analysis,
led to passage of the resolution to preserve the old standard
(Andreades, [1909] 1966, 90-102).
The

Land

Bank

proposal

Chamberlain and John Briscoe.

was

put

forth

by

Dr.

Hugh

Their idea was to raise a

public loan twice that of the Bank of England.

This loan

would be backed by the security of landed property and have an
interest rate of 3% per cent.

Chamberlain and Briscoe fell

into the same trap as John Law, viewing paper money backed by
land as equivilent, if not superior, to gold or silver.

Their

plan called for the printing of money equal to the total value
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of all property.

As Andreades ([1909] 1966, 104) points out,

these promoters knew that government coercion was needed to
carry out their scheme:
The promoters did not deny that the public
preferred the precious metals,
and that
in
consequence if the Land Bank were forced to pay in
gold, it would soon have to suspend its payments.
But they proposed to overcome this difficulty by
making the notes inconvertible and legal tender.
The British government in the spring of 1696 was again,
as is the case with all governments, in need of money, and the
Land Bank received royal assent on April 27th by way of a Ways
and Means Bill.

The bill was to raise £2,564,000, with the

interest on the loan to be covered by a salt tax.

But alas,

the Land Bank act died as quickly as it was engendered.

Only

£7,100 was subscribed, with £5,000 of that being the King's
investment.

With the Government on the brink of bankruptcy,

the Exchequer stepped in with an issue of Exchequer bills to
fill the breach. Also the King was able to secure a loan from
the Dutch in the amount of £500,000.

This scrambling for

funds was due to the fact that the government had borrowed all
that the Bank of England could lend, based on it not being
able to lend an amount more than its capital.

The Bank's

bills had fallen to a ten per cent discount.

Additionally,

its stock had dropped from 107 to 83 with the passage of the
Land

Bank

proposal

Exchequer bills.

and

the

subsequent

floating

of

the

The Bank had many competitors, with all of

them issuing their own paper.

As Carswell (1960, 18) writes:

Neither recoinage nor expanding trade could have
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been financed without paper money, which was issued
during the war in increasing quantity from the
Exchequer, the Bank of England, and the innumerable
goldsmiths and running cashes of Lombard Street.
It was the damage that the Bank received from the Land
Bank scheme, the re-coinage, and its pesky competitors, that
led its promoters to seek aid from the government in the form
of monopoly status.
useful

to

competition

the

The case was made that for the Bank to be

State,

which

its

"causes

notes

must

distrust

not

and

be

faced

contracts

with

credit

instead of enlarging it" (Andreades [1909] 1966, 107-10).
The main provisions of the act in 1697 which gave the
Bank of England monopoly status were:
(A)

The Bank would add £1,001,171 to its capital.

(B)

Subscriptions could be paid 80 per cent
Exchequer bills, 20 per cent in Bank notes.

(C)

Subscribers were to be incorporated in the company.

(D)

The Bank was granted monopoly status for the
duration of its charter until August 1, 1711,
since no other banking corporation was to be
established by an Act of Parliment.

(E)

Eight per cent interest was guaranteed by the
salt tax on tallies accepted in payment by the
Bank.

(F)

Before opening the subscription for the
additional capital, the original capital was
to be paid up to 100 per cent for each
proprietor.

(G)

The Bank was authorized to issue notes to the
amount of its original capital (£1,200,000),
plus the sums to be subscribed, on the
condition that they were payable on demand.

(H)

All property of the Bank was exempt from taxation.

(I)

It was to be a felony to forge or tamper with

in
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Bank notes.
By consequence of this act, £200,000 in Bank notes and
£800,000 in tallies were drawn out of circulation, thus the
discount on the remaining Bank notes disappeared, and these
bank

notes

began

to

circulate

without

bearing

interest

(Andreades [1909] 1966, 111-12).
England's war with France also ended in September, 1697,
relieving the government treasury of the burdensome expense of
the war, perhaps just in time.

Early in 1697, over £5 million

of short term government borrowings were due and had to be
extended, and to add to the distress, the Malt Lottery loan
subscription in April was a complete flop.5 The government's
credit was repaired with the help of the Bank of England,
three years of peace, and the successful floating of New East
India Company stock in 1698, which in turn loaned £2 million
to the Exchequer.

This new entity, like the Bank of England,

was allowed to use the government's debts that it owned as a
'fund of credit' (Dickson 1967, 57) .
The tranquility of peace was not to last long, as the War
of the Spanish Succession began when Louis XIV of France
marched

into

the

Spanish

Netherlands,

in

February

1701.

William, who hated Louis XIV, was eager to join the European
coalition.

However, the public was not in the mood for more

of William's war and commercial unrest.

In spite of three

years of peace, taxes and interest rates had remained high,
hangovers from the previous war debts.

But with a hostile
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enemy just accross the English Channel, the English joined the
fray in earnest, especially after the death of King William in
1702.
The

long

and bloody

England's treasury.

confrontation was

to

again

tax

The Bank of England supplied short-term

funding, with long-term funding supplied mainly by the sale of
96 to 99 year annuities.

Sidney Godolphin was named as Lord

Treasurer in 1702 by Queen Anne,

and was,

in the view of

Dickson (1967, 59) to manage "the national finances with great
care and skill." Godolphin seemed to be able to raise funds to
fight the

French with relative ease,

being aided by the

British army's battlefield conquests, which bolstered investor
confidence.

The war's expense was running at between £8

million to £9 million per year.

This unprecedented expense

was far greater than what could be extracted from the
populace by way of new taxation.

Thus, tax revenues through

the end of the century were mortgaged with long term debt.
From 1704 through 1710, the British government's long-term
borrowings totaled £10.4 million.

In addition to these loans

from the public, Godolphin borrowed £1.7 million in Exchequer
bills from the Bank of England, and obtained loans from the
East India Company.
By this time the public had become anxious about the
length of the war and its cost, both in blood and financially.
The harsh winter of 1708-9, which led to a bad harvest the
following summer, pushed up prices.

This inflation and the
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failure of peace talks at The Hague in August, was followed by
a bloody battle at Malplaquet in September and created an
adverse political climate that led to a new Tory Ministry the
following year.

The new Ministry sacked Godolphin on August

8, 1720, with Robert Harley being named Chancellor of the
Exchequer two days later.

In May of the following year Harley

was named Lord Treasurer

(Dickson 1967, 59-64).

In the meantime, Sir John Blunt and his partners had
transformed the Sword Blade Company into a finance company in
order, as Carswell (1960, 34) says, to "annex for themselves
as large a part as they could of the politico-financial empire
that had been carved out by the Bank of England."

The Sword

Blade Company's business was to acquire estates with the
proceeds from stock issues that were paid for in government
obligations.

The obligations chosen were Army Debentures,

issued by the Paymaster of the Forces.
these debentures was 85,

The market price of

for which the holders were then

offered Sword Blade stock valued at 100.

The government was

thus traded their own debt instument, at a discount, for their
land.
In the spring of 1704, the Bank of England took offense
to the activities of the- Sword Blade Company, serving notice
to the Treasury that the monopoly clause of the Act of 1697
was being violated by Mr.
contended

that

the

Act

Blunt and his company.
of

1697

only

prohibited

Blunt
rival

corporations set up by an Act of Parliment, which the Sword
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Blade Company had not.

By May of 1707, the Bank managed to

get the Treasury's promise that it would take action against
Sword Blade Company and to fortify the Bank's privileges.
The

Sword

Blade

Company

provided

good,

healthy

competition for the Bank of England, but the Treasury needed
money, and the Bank was willing to lend £1% million at 4% per
cent (Carswell, 1960, 34-37).

With the Treasury getting what

it wanted, it in turn extended the Bank's charter to 1732,
along with allowing the bank to double its existing capital of
£2,201,171.

The additional capital was raised before noon the

same day subscriptions became available.

Andreades ([1909]

1966, 122) provides a breakdown of the Bank's capital position
at this point:
£2 .201.171
Capital of the B a n k ..............
This Capital doubled.. ..................
£4.402.343
And increased by the£400,000now advanced
£4,802,343
To which must be added for the Exchequerbills£1.775.027
Total
£6,577,370
The activities of the Bank, along with those of the Sword
Blade Company and the East India Company, ensured that there
was plenty of money available.

As Carswell (1960, 43) writes:

"The war had encouraged, not checked, the advance of wealth
and the multiplication of paper.

It was no uncommon thing,

now,

'plum',

for a man

to have made

a

as current

slang

described £100,000."
As was the case in the Bank's original charter,

the

Bank's note issue was only restricted by the amount of its
capital.

Andreades ([1909] 1966, 124) quotes H.D. Macleod's
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stinging criticism of this scheme:
Now, to a certain extent, this plan might be
attended with no evil consequences, but it is
perfectly clear that its principle is utterly
vicious.
There is nothing so wild or absurd in
John Law's Theory of Money as this. His scheme of
basing a paper currency upon land is sober sense
compared to it.
If for every debt the Government
incurs an equal amount of money is to be created,
why, here we have the philosopher's stone at once.
What is the long sought Eldorado compared to this?
Even there the gold required to be picked up and
fashioned into coin.
The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Harley, had
inherited from his successor, Godolphin, a mountain of debt,
and the immediate problem of having to satisfy the creditors
of the Navy, all of whom were anxious to be paid.

Harley

received proposals from John Blunt and George Caswell of the
Sword Blade Company, and from Sir Ambrose Crowley, a large
contractor with

the Navy Board.

The

Blunt-Caswell

plan

essentially called for the incorporation of the Navy and other
creditors, along with cancelling the state's debt to them in
exchange for stock.
Harley was not flush with options.

He did not have the

cash to pay the floating debt, and had no alternative to the
Blunt-Caswell proposal.
royal assent.

On June 12, 1711, the plan was given

The government's short term creditors, holding

close to £9 million, were to be incorporated under the Great
Seal

as

'the Governor

and Company

of Merchants

of Great

Britian Trading to the South Seas and other parts of America
and for encouraging the Fishery.'
This new entity, in exchange for extinguishing £9 million
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in government debt, was given a monopoly on trade with South
America, on the east coast from the River Orinoco to Tierra
del Fuego, and for the entire west coast.

This region had for

some time held an allure of riches to the British.

Thus, it

was the perfect vehicle to placate the government's creditors,
given its potental for high profits.

In fact the British,

since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, had attempted to break the
Spanish
licence.
opening

stronghold

on

the

Americas,

either

by

force

This attempt, like the others, was to fail.
of

this

market

would

come

much

later,

in

or
The
the

nineteenth century, with the political independence of the
Spanish colonies.
The establishment of the South Sea Company coincided with
the British expedition in August, 1711 against Quebec, and the
planning of an Anglo-Dutch attack on the Spanish West Indies.
Dickson

(1967,

66)

theorizes

that:

"It

can

therefore

be

regarded as part of a three-pronged drive for empire in the
new world, though there is little doubt that in fact this
grand design was three-quarters bluff,

intended to assist

Harley's peace negotiations."
At war's end in 1713, the South Sea Company's trading
rights were defined.

The company had permission to send,

annually, one 500 ton ship to trade at the fairs of Cartagena
or Veracruz and to send 150 ton supply ships to supply food to
the factories.

In addition,

it was given a thirty year

contract to supply African slaves to New Spain.

This contract
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called

for

the

delivery

of

4,800

slaves

per

year

of

a

specified condition, with the company paying taxes on 4,000 of
these.

The King of Spain was to receive 10 per cent of the

company's slave trade profit in addition to the 28 per cent of
all other trading profits.

This limited amount of trading

privilege, along with the payment to the King of Spain of his
share, left but a meager return for the company.
It was to take over two years to even come close to
selling out the South Sea
finally

closed

on

subscription.

Christmas

£9,177,968 having been raised,

of

1713,

The books were
with

a

total

of

an amount smaller than the

£9,471,324 envisaged by the South Sea act.

The company was

to

and

receive

management

annually
from

the

£550,678

in

government.

government paid promptly.

interest
In

the

£8,000

for

beginning

the

But this situation changed, and by

the summer of 1715, interest was six months in arrears.

With

no interest income coming in and little progress made in
starting trade with Spanish America, the company was quickly
in financial trouble.

In 1712, 1713 and 1714 the proprietors

were given the option of receiving dividends in cash or in
bonds.

In 1715, no choice was given, dividends were paid in

bonds; and in 1716, dividends were paid in the form of stock.
Fortunately for the subscribers the stock was now at par.
From 1712 through 1715, the government used South Sea
stock to pay creditors and to secure loans.

"For the use of

the public" £2,371,402 of the company's capital had been set
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aside; plus £500,000 in stock was created for the government's
use by the South Sea Act.
and eventually,
encumbrances,

This use of funds was not popular,

in 1717, the company was able to shed its

with

Parliment

proclaiming

that

government

deficiences were to be paid, in the future, out of the General
Fund.

Also, by this date progress had been made on the trade

front and the company appeared to have weathered its difficult
beginnings.
By

the

use

of

the

South

Sea

government was able to rid itself

Company
of

its

vehicle,

the

floating debt.

However this repayment did nothing to fund the burden of the
war expense that had reached its height at that time (1711).
To fund this shortfall, Harley created Exchequer bills on a
massive scale to handle the short-term needs, and used the
Bank of England as receiver for £9.2 million in lottery loans
floated

in 1711 and 1712 to cover the revenue deficit.

Harley went on to float smaller lottery loans in 1713 and
1714,

with the Bank acting as receiver.

One loan was to

discharge the

debts of the Civil List, and the otherwas to go

to the public

service (Dickson, 1967, 59-75).

The War of the Spanish Succession was finally over in
1713.

England and the other participants had each created a

huge mountain of debt with which they were forced to contend.
On

September

£40,357,011.

29, 1714,

Britian's

national debt

stood at

Additionally, there were over £4% million

in

Exchequer Bills outstanding, not to mention debts of back pay
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to the army and foreign subsidies of unknown amounts.

The

government undertook a massive restructure of its debts, in
hopes of lessening the interest burden.
This

restructure

was

accomplished

through

three

conversion Acts.

The first called for the conversion of the

1711-12

loans

lottery

outstanding

and

half

of

the

1705

Bankers' Annuities debt to be exchanged into five per cent
stock to be managed by the Bank of England.

The second act

reduced the interest rate on various debts owed to the South
Sea

Company

and

the

Bank

of

England.

The

third

act

established a sinking fund for reduction of the national debt,
and called for reducing the interest rate on Exchequer bills
to 1% per cent.
These measures, which were implemented between 1715-1719,
were for the most part successful, reducing the government's
annual interest charge by 13 per cent and providing welcome
relief

to

the

state.

Although

the

yield

on

government

obligations had been lessened most holders of the government
stock felt their principal was more secure.

This feeling was

reflected in the market price of government stock.

At the end

of 1717, the stock was trading four points above its par
value.
However, there was one finance problem left to be solved,
that of the high and virtually perpetual interest to be paid
to

annuitants.

These

annuity

holders

would

have

to

be

persuaded to exchange their annuities for redeemable stock.
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The Treasury turned to the South Sea Company in 1719 with a
plan for this conversion.

The interest payable on these

annuities was £135,000 yearly, thus the Treasury calculated
that this interest should be capitalized at a market price of
eleven and a half years purchase, or £1,552,500.

To be added

to this was £168,750 in back interest owed the company and the
£778,750 the company was to lend to the Exchequer.

Thus, the

total increase in the state's debt was to be £2.5 million as
a part of this conversion.
In the spring of 1719, it turned out that only two-thirds
of the subscription was taken.

As a result the South Sea

Company's

£1,746,844

capital

£11,746,844.

increased by

to

a total

of

The subscription, which was payable in fifths,

was fully funded in December, 1719, with the company receiving
£592,800.

The Exchequer was to be paid £544,142.

This was

raised by selling £520,000 in new stock at 114 in July.

The

company's claims against the state now stood at £193,582.
Thus, when all was said and done, the company had made a tidy
profit of £242,240 from the operation,
stock still in hand.

and had £24,000 in

This success led to a much bigger

operation of the same kind the following year.
Across the Channel, in 1719, John Law's System was at its
height, and was viewed with more than a twinge of jealousy and
concern from the Brits.

Law's debt conversion had already

inspired John Blunt and his fellow Sword Blade partners.

But

what concerned the British government was the ever increasing
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flight of capital leaving London to seek the much-talked-about
returns to be enjoyed in Paris.

With further debt conversions

being contemplated by the government,
loss of capital to hinder its plans.

it did not want this

These fears were raised

when rumors began to circulate that John Law was opening a
large "bear" account to depress British Government stocks.

At

the same time, another rumor had him buying the East India and
South Sea Companies so as to become the financial czar of
Europe.

But the government's worries were pointed in the

wrong direction. John Law's system was about to fall apart,
and besides,

Law had a very ambitious imitator in Sir John

Blunt who was about to embark on his own grand scheme.
Two categories of debt were particularly troublesome to
the government.

One was the ninety-six and ninety-nine year

annuities which had been sold when interest rates were high,
and could not be redeemed by a lump-sum payoff or a sinking
fund (they could be redeemed only if annuitants were pursuaded
voluntarily).
which were

The other category was miscellaneous debts

being redeemed

by

Walpole's

approxiamately

£750,000 per year.

service,

including

not

management

Total

sinking

fund,

government

charges

and

at

debt

amounts

converted into stocks already, was over £1.5 million per year,
and as Carswell (1960, 103-4) relates:
... this was the amount negotiators at the Treasury
were concerned to disguise as a single huge
redeemable annuity to the South Sea Company.
For
this purpose it was necessary to represent the
whole as a capital sum... To keep one's head in the
maze of South Sea finance, it is important to lay
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firm hold on the fact that the capital figures were
mere paper calculations.
The capitalization of the redeemable debt was straight
forward and totaled approximately £16 million.
irredeemable

annuities,

the

difficult to formulate.

capitalization

As for the

was

much

more

The overriding objective was to

reduce the cost of this debt as much as possible.

This was

accomplished by capitalizing these annuities at their original
term of years,
issued.

but without regard to the date they were

Ninety-nine and ninety-six year annuities were capped

at five per cent for twenty years, with the thirty-two year
and

the

Lottery

annuities

interest for fourteen years.

being

capped

at

six per

cent

The total capitalization for the

annuities was £15 million, making the grand total £31 million.
Against this staggering sum of £31 million,

an equal

amount of South Sea stock was to materialize when debt holders
would voluntarily exchange one for the other.

The amount of

stock that the company would issue for any given debt was to
be decided by the market.
conversion,

Thus, as was the case with the 1719

the higher the price of the

stock,

the more

profitable the conversion would be for the Company.
The Company's deal with the government, in regards to the
conversion,

was

very precise:

for

every

pound

of yearly

expense spared the government, the Company received a pound a
year from the government.

The exception to this was

on

irredeemables where the Company would receive only 14s for
each pound the government was saved.

This was worth £40,000
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a year

to

the

Exchequer.

The

ultimate

savings

to

the

government was to come after seven years when the government
would only pay 4 per cent on all of the converted debt, a
savings of roughly £400,000.
could be redeemed.

In addition this obligation

Thus, the government was allowed to pay

off the debt in total whenever it might be able.

It was

calculated that if the interest savings were applied according
to sinking fund principles, Britian's debt would be retired in
twenty-five years.

And if the prospect of being debt free was

not enough incentive, the Company offered a carrot that was to
be paid at the end of the one year conversion term: a gift to
the

Exchequer

of

£3

million,

payable

in

four

quarterly

installments, to be used to pay off redeemable debts incurred
before 1716, with any amounts that remained, being available
for use in whatever way the Exchequer desired.
This £3 million sweetener also served as an insurance
policy

for

Blunt.

If

all

of

the

redeemables

were

not

converted, this £3 million would be available to pay these
debts off.

Thus, with the Bank of England owning most of

these notes, the threat of repayment was enough for the Bank,
which would not be able to reinvest the cash at attractive
returns, to convert the debts it held for South Sea stock.
Blunt knew that he would never earn, in the normal course of
business, the £3 million in cash needed to make this promised
gift,

for every penny of income would have to go toward

payment of the five per cent dividend on the capital.

What
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Blunt was counting on was a rise in the share price of South
Sea stock to generate the needed funds.
Blunt calculated correctly that if a boom in Stock prices
was engendered, holders of government annuities would quickly
exchange this debt for the opportunity to make huge capital
gains relatively quickly.

The fuel needed for this boom was

endogenous to the plan, as Carswell (1960, 108) points out:
The plan amounted to the injection into the economy
which was already booming, of another £5 million or
so of new money-ten times the injection of the
previous year-with a simultaneous lowering of
interest rates.
The final days of 1719 brought news that spured the
fortunes of the South Sea Company.

Peace between Spain and

England had been declared on the terms of the latter, opening
up trade passages to South America.
Blunt's

grand

plan

to

be

The time had come for

presented

Chancellor of the Exchequer,

to

John Aislabie,

the

Parliment.

laid the plan

before the House of Commons on the basis that the plan was
forthcoming from the Company.

Secretary Craggs followed with

the suggestion that the House receive the plan.

But to

Aislabie's dismay,

Thomas

an influential Anglo-Irish Whig,

Brodrick, suggested that the House consider other offers
before it accepted this one, and the measure was not voted on.
This

allowed

the

Bank

of

England

time

to

make

a

rival

proposal.
The Bank was suddenly put in a position of having to
fight for the top financial perch upon which it had sat for so
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many years.

For ten years the South Sea Company had slowly

increased the amount of annual payments it received from the
government, to over £500,000, and now the Bank was faced with
the possibility that the South Sea Company would be the
receipient of £2 million in annual annuity payments, at its
expense.

It was feared that the loss of this conversion would

relegate the Bank to being just an ordinary commercial bank,
with its old enemy,

the Sword Blade Company,

the credit-

creating agency behind the South Sea Company, depriving them
of their lofty position within the London money market.
The

bidding

for

the

conversion

was

spirited.

The

critical deal point, which the Bank and the Company continued
to make more and more attractive, was the amount to be given
as a gift to the Exchequer.

The South Sea Company's original

£3 million was increased to £3% million, only to be increased
to £5% million with the Bank's bid.

But the Company finally

won out by raising the stakes of the gift to

£4 million

certain to the Exchequer, with the possibility of as much as
another £3% million.

The additional amount was dependent upon

the amount of debt that was actually converted.

Also, the

Company promised to make the annuity open for redemption in
four years rather than the seven years originally proposed,
and, at the same time, reduce the interest rate to four per
cent.

Finally the Company offered to circulate

£1 million in

Exchequer bills with no management fee or interest.

This was

an offer that the Bank of England could not match, and the
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South Sea proposal passed in the House with ease.

With the

news of the Company's triumph, the traders in Exchange Alley
bid the price of its stock up thirty-one points, from 129 to
160, and what a journalist of the time called 'the English
Mississippi' was underway (Carswell 1960, 98-113).
As

the

debt

conversion

was

being

negotiated

and

subsequently bid for, English pounds continued to flow across
the channel into the awaiting tempest that John Law's system
had now become.

After hitting a high

Mississippi Company shares had fallen.

in January,

1720,

Law was now desperatly

trying to hold up the shares at the expense of his inflation
ravaged currency,
people.

and the financial freedom of the French

Law's proposals put forth in the spring, in hopes of

salvaging the currency,

were met with suspicion from the

saviest of London's investors, who began to pull their
money out of Paris and return it to the London market.
John Blunt and the rest of the South Sea stock promoters,
like John Law in the case of the Mississippi shares, sparked
the fire of speculation in the Company's shares, by allowing
the governing class the opportunity to be in on the ground
floor of the stock issue.
profit.

This virtually assured them a

Nearly all of London's bourgousie had purchased their

shares prior to the publishing of the Bill calling for the
debt conversion, on March 17th.

Subsequently, between March

19th and 21st, the share price soared from 218 to 32 0 on
reports from Paris that John Law was taking criticism from the
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Regent, and having nightmares.

A second reading of the Bill

on the 21st inspired a debate on the 23rd over whether the
terms of the conversion should be fixed in advance and
be written into the statute.

The debate lasted six hours,

with contrary news causing the price of the shares to trade in
a broad range of 110 points, between 270 and 380.

The company

prevailed, which propelled the stock to 400 for a brief period
before it retreated back to 330.
On

March

25th,

the

Bank

of

England

was

further

humiliated. It was announced that the entire debt held by the
Bank (£3.75 million) that was not to be redeemed by the South
Sea Company would be repaid by the end of the year.

The

payoff of this debt meant that the Bank would no longer be a
national institution.

Any support from those individuals in

government that the Bank had enjoyed was now firmly behind the
South Sea Company, with more than a few having been given
shares in the company to enjoy in the speculation and reap the
financial reward.
April 7th.

The Bill finally received Royal Assent on

The Company had provided £574,500 worth of stock

in bribes to government officials to get the bill passed, and
now London was poised for the boom.

Carswell

(1960,

127)

added up the liabilities that the Company would incur over the
next year

(£11.4 million),

from which the profits of the

conversion would have to cover.
needed to break even.

A share price of 140 was

On April 7th the stock stood at 335.

The South Sea Company's subscription and debt conversion
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was begun in April, with the Company's primary motive being
very clear: to market its new stock while the share price was
rising, while defering the second conversion of government
debt until August, when its share price was at its height
(1,000).

This would maximize its exchange advantage over

government

debt

holders.

The

Company's

first

stock

subscription was on April 14th, with 2,250,000 issued at a per
share price of 300.

The terms of payment were twenty per cent

down, with the balance to be paid for over sixteen months with
calls every two months.
The second issue came two weeks later, on April 29th,
with 1% million issued at a price of 400.

The terms quickly

became more liberal, ten per cent down, with the balance over
twenty months payable in nine calls at three to four month
intervals.

With the market frantically trading up the stock,

the Company made its third and largest issue on June 17th,
issuing

5 million at 1,000 per share.

Terms again called for

ten per cent down, but payments were stretched over fifty-four
months, with nine payments made semi-annually.

The fourth,

and final issue was made on the 24th of August, with 1,2 50,000
issued at, again, a 1,000 share price.

The terms of this

issue called for twenty per cent down, with the balance to be
paid over the next thirty-six months.

Had all payment calls

been made, the Company would have received £75,2 50,000 over
the subsequent four and one-half years!

The market had two

vehicles with which to trade the South Sea Company: the actual
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shares and the subscription receipts.
Demand for the shares was enormous, as exibited both by
the increase in price and how quickly the shares were snapped
up during the four offerings.

The first was said to have been

filled in an hour, the second and third issues in a few hours,
and the final issue in three hours.

There was even talk of an

additional issue, however it was scuttled in early September
when the market was beginning to crumble.
The decision by John Blunt and the rest of the South Sea
director's to begin with stock issues or "Money Subscriptions"
as

they

were

known,

rather

than

the

conversion

of

the

government debt was driven by the following motives, outlined
by Dickson (1967, 129):
...first, to the knowledge that they could legally
increase their capital without any limit, provided
they applied part of the proceeds to paying off the
government's creditors; second, to their wish to
take the exchanges in stages, rather than spoiling
the market by taking them all at once.
A third
motive was, of course, their wish to cash as
quickly as possible the cheque which the Government
had handed them without waiting to see if there
were the funds to meet it.
When the Company began to convert the annuities to South
Sea stock, the holders of these annuities were eager to get
hold of the new South Sea shares and sell them in the now
booming market, but the Company was not keen on a flood of
shares pouring into the market, putting a damper on the share
price.

Annuitants or their attorneys showed up at South Sea

House, with their title documents in tow, to sign their names
and the annual amounts they received into the books.

These
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documents were headed by an introductory statement that most
of them, unfortunately, neglected to read.

This preamble gave

three South Sea clerks the power to subscribe the capital
stock in whatever way the company saw fit to the annuitants.
Rather than delivering shares, a book entry was made,
with the actual stock not being delivered until December 30,
1720.

This method was repeated in July and again for the

third and, as it turned out, final debt conversion in August.
The government creditors had thus exchanged their debts for no
more than the expectation of possessing South Sea stock.
The primary holders of the government debts were, not the
unsophisticated masses, but no less than the powerful Bank of
England,

Million

individuals.

Bank,

Dickson

and
(1967,

a

host

134,136)

of

wealthy,

powerful

gives the result of

their collective gullibility:
80%
of the
long and short annuities
(the
Irredeemables) and 85% of Government ordinary stock
(the Redeemables) were converted into South Sea
stock. The company's nominal capital increased by
over £2 6m., on which the Government was to pay
interest partly at 5% and partly at 4% until
midsummer 1727, then entirely at 4%.
Despite
bitter pressure on the part of the disappointed
public creditors in the winter of 1720-1, the
exchanges were not rescinded,...
When it put the accounts together, the company
found that, thanks to the rise in the market price
of its stock, it had been able to persuade holders
of £26m. of the £31m. subscribable debts to
exchange them for South Sea stock so over-valued
that they only obtained £8.5m. of it.
By the late spring, early summer of 1720, foreign buying
began to push the price of South Sea stock ever higher, as
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investors fled Paris in ever increasing numbers.

Also, specie

from Holland began to arrive in London to be used for the
purchase

of

shares.

At

the same time the

Company gave

Exchange Alley a liquidity injection, by giving the directors
the power to lend money on the security of South Sea stock.
This action produced £11 million in loans.

At the same time,

the Bank of England was throwing gasoline on the fire in the
form of loans on its own stock.

The government also got into

the

Sea Company

act

by

lending the

South

£1 million

in

Exchequer bills that were subsequently used to purchase the
Company's shares.

Even the Royal African Company, which lent

£102,000, joined the party.
The South Sea share price was now rocketing upward.

At

the start of June the price was 600 and by the end of that
month it stood near 1,000.

This tremendous speculation led to

a flood of other proposals for new companies
Alley.

in Exchange

Many of the proposed operations were swindles, with

promoters marketing a particular stock with the tool of low
down payments and deferred payment plans, only to confiscate
the down payments and leave the city.
respectable

ventures.

proposals hit

The

its height

promoted in that month.

number

Some, however, were
of

"bubble

company"

in June with eighty-eight being

Only eleven more were sponsered the

entire rest of the year.
Speculation was not limited just to South Sea shares or
these "bubble companies."

Other securities rose as well,
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along with the price of land, as the following quote of Lord
Bristol, who was negotiating with William Astell over the
price of a land parcel from Dickson (1967, 147), illustrates:
"land has almost doubly increased in value since ye time I
first fix'd for your final answer."6
Ironically, at the height of speculation in June, the pin
that would eventually pop the bubble was being fashioned by
the British government.

On June 11th, the King's assent was

given to the Bubble Act, which made it an offense to 'presume
to act' as a corporate body, or to divert an existing charter
to unauthorized ends.

In August, four companies were found to

be in violation of the Act: the English Copper Company, the
Royal Lustering Company, the York Buildings Company, and the
Welsh Copper Company.

Although the Act had been enacted to

keep capital from being channelled away from the South Sea
Company, the writs against the four companies signaled the
beginning of the steep fall in the price of South Sea shares.
In spite of desparate attempts to increase the demand for
shares by declaring a thirty’per cent Christmas dividend (ala
John Law), a torrent of sell orders descended upon Exchange
Alley.

By mid-September the share price had dropped to 520,

and by October the price was 200, on the its way to 120 in
December.

The bubble had exploded (Dickson 1967, 122-53).

After the 'house of cards' had finally been leveled, the
financial prospects of the South Sea Company were put in a
clearer light.

The Company's only asset,

besides trading
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privileges that were for the most part unexploitable, was a
stream of

income

from the Exchequer

million per year.

in the amount of £2

The bad news was that expenses for the

coming year were £14.5 million.

The South Sea Company was

hopelessly insolvent (Carswell 1960, 238-39).
In spite of the Company technically being bankrupt, it
was able to stay in business for many years through a massive
reorganization engineered by Sir Robert Walpole.
ability to

Walpole's

sift through the wreckage and decide

who the

winners and who the losers would be from this financial train
wreck

made

him

a

revered

and

beloved

man

of

such

high

reputation that he went on to rule England as Prime Minister
for twenty years.
Clough's

(1968,

This reverence for Walpole is evidenced by
217)

comment:

"He

[Walpole]

was

able,

moreover, to save for government bondholders about 60 per cent
of their investment, and he was successful in salvaging enough
of the South Sea Company to keep the organization in business,
eventually, however, with government securities as its only
assets."

Clough must not realize that government securities

were the only asset the company ever had.

Furthermore, we can

only wonder if the government bondholders at the time thought
that taking a 40 per cent 'haircut' on their investment was a
good deal.
Far from being an isolated mania engendered only by the
urges of a populace with the gambling spirit, the South Sea
Bubble was the inevitable result of a government living beyond
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its

means.

Britian

had

the

help of

some

enterprising

entrepenuers who, with the example of John Law, produced the
various schemes and institutions through which to create the
money needed to pay for its wars and largess.

As is always

the case when paper money is created illegitimately,

some

groups benefited at the expense of others, with speculation
taking the place of honest work and production as the way to
acheive wealth.

This environment of frenzied speculation led

to political corruption, great disparities of wealth, fraud,
and violence.

As aptly put by Andreades ([1909] 1966, 143-

44) :
But all these must not lead us to infer that the
South Sea crisis was beneficial to England. It had
produced
enormous
agitation
and
an
unjust
redistribution of wealth and had very nearly ruined
the Hanoverian monarchy. ... Those who shared in
it knew perfectly well that it was only a fraud,
but hoped notwithstanding to make some profit out
of it. ...These speculators-and this is one of the
most painful features of the crisis-represented all
classes of society, and things were so arranged
that the poorest man might ruin himself as easily
as the millionaire.
The big winner in this story of financial debauchery was,
of course, the British government, which was able to transform
an insurmountable mountain of debt, through their agent, the
South Sea Company, and at the expense of the public creditors,
into a much more manageable expense.
the

government's

debt

service

was

In effect, a portion of
repudiated,

with

the

financial pain being thrust upon those people who were least
able to shoulder it, an unsuspecting public.
The South Sea bubble episode was relatively short, as
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compared with that of the Mississippi Bubble.

The difference

between the two bubbles was that Law used the Royal Bank to
print more money, and thus sustained the system for a longer
period of time.

Conversely, the Bank of England stood apart

from the South Sea government debt conversion.

As the bubble

burst, the Bank of England, concerned about its own survival,
discontinued discounting, called in loans made against its own
stock and loans made to the East India Company,

and sold

customers interest-bearing notes in an attempt to raise cash
(Giuseppi 1966,44).
If the Bank of England had been successful in out-bidding
the South Sea Company for the conversion of the government
debt,

a

replay

possibility.

of

The

the Mississippi

bubble

is

a distinct

likely result being a British populace

suffering even greater financial pain.
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CHAPTER NOTES

1. Hearth tax was a tax on all dwellings except cottages, and was
levied based upon the number of hearths or stoves that were in a
given dwelling.
The tax was very unpopular and as can easily be
imagined, hard to collect.
2. The £300,000 difference was to be raised by annuities.
3. £10,000 was the maximum subscription allowable.
Ten other
contributors besides the King and Queen contributed the maximum
amount.
4. This quote is taken from Locke's pamphlet entitled, Further
considerations concerning raising the value of money.
Andreades
indicates that this pamphlet has been reprinted at the end of,
McCulloch's Principles of Political Economy.
5. The Malt lottery was to issue 140,000 £10 tickets, raising
£1,400,000. Only 1,763 tickets were sold, the rest of the tickets
were used by the Exchequer as cash. (Dickson, 1967, 49)
6. Quoted from Letter Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol
(Wells, 1894), ii. 126, Bristol to Astell August 4, 1720.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONi INCREASES IN THE
SUPPLY OF MONEY. SPECULATIVE
BUBBLES. AND THE AUSTRIAN
MALINVESTMENT THEORY

As we seek explanations for the causes of speculative
bubbles, the forthcoming responses from the different strains
of modern mainstream economic thought are far from satisfying.
The rational expectations (Rat-X) school, after much muddling
of figures and formulas, comes to the conclusion that bubbles
are not possible since all market participants act rationally
and

can

foretell

the

future.

As

this

paper has

shown,

speculative bubbles do occur, and market participants (people)
cannot

foretell

rationally.

the

future,

and

do

not

necessarily

act

Econometrics has again struck out in its attempts

to explain, let alone predict, the behavior of humans. But, of
course, rather than admit that their tools are inadequate, the
Rat-X group concludes that, empirically, it cannot be shown
that speculative bubbles exist.

Thus, they do not.

This

otiose view flies in the face of historical fact.
John

Maynard

Keynes,

whose

school

of

thought

when

followed as policy is the modern catalyst for speculative
bubbles,

wrote

recognized

full

at

length concerning
well

the

damage

speculation.
that

Keynes

speculation

and
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malinvestment could inflict on people.

What Keynes did not

recognize was the root cause of these episodes.

Instead, he

focused on the results which he thought were the causes.

The

following paragraph from Keynes (1964, 161) sums up his view
of speculation:
..there
is
the
instability
due
to
the
characteristic of human nature that a large
proportion of our positive activities depend on
spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical
expectation,
whether moral
or hedonistic
or
economic.
Most, probably, of our decisions to do
something positive,. . . can only be taken as a
result of animal spirits.
Keynes held the view, as reflected in the above quote,
that these "animal spirits" lead to damaging speculation,.and
he of course prescribed government restrictions on investment
to solve the problem.
So, on one end of the spectrum, we have the rational
expectation

camp,

which

says

that

all

people

(market

participants) are rational, and, being in possession of all
available data, can foretell the future.
degrees opposite the Rat-X

One hundred eighty

group is Keynes,

people as being possessed by "animal spirits",

who saw all
i.e., being

irrational, which will thus cause frequent instability and
speculation

in

an

economy,

with

the

obvious

cure

being

intervention by the State, which is assumed to be rational.
By reflecting back on what has been written
paper,
occur.

in this

it is obvious that speculative bubbles can and do
And if Keynes'

speculative

bubbles,

"animal spirits" were the cause of
these

bubbles

would

have

happened
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continually, ad infinitum, throughout history.

Given the fact

that this "animal spirit" is an inherent human trait, that is
not turned off and on, these speculative episodes would be
constantly engendered through no other impetus but the human
spirit.

This is clearly not the case.

The three speculative bubble episodes explored in this
paper, besides having the obvious similarity that they all
occurred, share the common trait that a government sanctioned
bank, along with government policy, created large increases in
the supply of money in each economy, prior to and during these
episodes.

Each

episode

especially the Tulipmania.

was

in

its

However,

own

way

different,

the results were the

same: boom, speculation, crash, then financial pain.
Another common element to all three experiences was a man
named John Law.

Law was born in 1671 after the Tulipmania

bubble, but he studied the workings of the Bank of Amsterdam,
which played a part in the Tulipmania, greatly admiring its
operation and its positive effect on the Dutch economy.

The

Bank of Amsterdam was the centerpost of the strongest economy
in the world because of the soundness of its operation and
therefore the Dutch currency.

The Bank accepted coin and

bullion and issued bank money against these deposits.

All

bank money were backed one hundred per cent (in the Bank's
beginning) by specie and thus great confidence in this money
was engendered.
Because of the soundness of this money and the Dutch free

125

coinage policy, immense amounts of coin and bullion flowed to
Amsterdam from other parts of Europe, America and Japan. This
torrent of coin and bullion is

reflected in the deposits of

the Bank of Amsterdam, which increased an estimated 60 per
cent in the five year period (1633-1638) which encompasses the
Tulipmania

episode.

Total

mint

output

of

the

South

Netherlands for the 163 6-8 period was two and a half times
greater than the amount minted from 1630-2.

This huge influx

of money, albeit sound money, led, as Del Mar ([1895] 1969,
351) writes, to "the curious mania of buying tulips at prices
often exceeding that of the ground on which they were grown."
The culmination of Tulipmania came in January 1637 when, for
example,

the price

of the Witte Croonen tulip bulb rose

approximately 26 times in the space of that month, only to
crash to a price of one-twentieth of its peak price the first
week in February of that same year.
After studying the operations of the Bank of Amsterdam,
during the course of his travels throughout Europe, Law began
to formulate monetary theories and banking proposals, which in
turn he advanced to States throughout Europe.

Law believed

that silver and gold were ill suited to serve as money, that
their value was subject to fluctuation depending upon supply.
Initially, Law's plan called for paper money that was backed
by land, thinking that this paper money would better satisfy
the qualities necessary in money.
Law was initially unsuccessful in selling his proposal to
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any European governments, even that of his native Scotland.
His views also began to change, as he studied other banks
including the Bank of England, which was formed in 1694.

Law

was impressed with the Bank of England's ability to pay for
England's war against France, with paper money.

He began to

view stocks as money that was superior to silver, thinking
that they were inflation proof.
Law was finally able to find a taker for his scheme in
1716, when he began the General Bank in Paris.

France at that

time was devastated economically, after fighting the War of
the Spanish Succession and piling up huge debts.

Law was

intent on refinancing this government debt so as to lower
interest rates and stimulate the languid French economy.

To

accomplish this, Law began the Company of the West, whose only
asset to speak of was the trading privilege with Louisiana.
After selling shares to capitalize the company, Law refinanced
the government's depreciated debt.
Law then set out to put his system in motion.

He was

finally able to convince the Regent to make the General Bank
part of the State, with it becoming the Royal Bank in late
1718.

Law then merged three companies together to form what

has been commonly known as the Mississippi Company.

With the

Royal Bank issuing 159.9 million livres in fresh banknotes,
the price of the Mississippi Company shares began to take off
in early 1719.

In the second half of that same year, with

Royal Bank issuing another 220.6 million livres

worth of
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banknotes,
extended

combined with Law's low down payment,

terms method of marketing

the

stock,

and the

the price

continued to climb, allowing Law to issue more shares.

He

then used using the capital to refinance more of the
government's debt.
The share price peaked at 10,100 livres, in January 1720,
aided by increases in the supply of money that was to total
2.1 billion livres by May of 1720.

In the spring of 1720, the

system was beginning to unravel, leading Law to issue a series
of decrees attempting first to devalue silver, then to devalue
shares and banknotes.

With investors attempting to sell

shares and convert the proceeds to specie, Law frantically
tried to keep the system afloat, and in fact was able to do
so,

given

the

lack of

specie

due to hoarding

and Law's

policies.

But by the end of the year, the bubble had been

deflated.

In September, shares were 43 per cent of the high.

Indeed, in pound sterling terms, Mississippi shares were only
14 per cent of their highs, which more truly reflects the
consequences of the massive increase in the supply of money
engineered by Law.
While speculation was running rampant, commodity prices
were exploding over the course of four years,
Paris, but in other cities in France.

not only in

Some cities experienced

worse inflation, and for some it was not as severe.

The big

loser was, of course, the laboring class, whose wages never
caught up with prices.
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Law's "success" with the Mississippi System, was viewed
with

envy

and

fear

from

across

the

Channel

in England.

Britain, like France, had heavily encumbered itself, with the
help of the Bank of England and Lottery loans, to fight the
war of the Spanish Succession.

The Bank of England was an

innovator

in

paper

accounts.

Its entire capital base was made up of government

the

creation

of

money

and

checking

debt, with its charter allowing it to issue notes up to the
amount of its capital.
The Bank of England was constantly hounded by competitors
who wanted a share of the Bank's lucrative business.
these competitors was the Sword Blade Company,
headed by Sir John Blunt.

One of

which was

This Sword Blade Company was to

serve as the credit creating arm of Blunt's South Sea Company.
In 1711, this company was given the monopoly rights to trade
with

South America.

Unfortunately,

the

Spanish were

greatly hinder the exploitation of this monopoly.
for this monopoly,

the company refinanced

to

In exchange

£9 million

in

government debt.
But this was just the beginning.

In 1719, with total

government debt well over £40 million, the South Sea Company
proposed a massive refinance of the government's debt, ala
John Law.

The Company was forced to bid against the Bank of

England for this operation, and finally won out, by offering
extraordinary terms and extensive bribery.

Once the bid had

been won, the price of South Sea stock took off, which was
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necessary for Blunt's plan to work.
its money

on the

conversion,

by

The Company would make
exploiting

the

exchange

difference between the government debt and inflated share
prices.
The South Sea shares moved quickly to 1,000, with the aid
of Company loans totaling £11 million, the government loaning
£1 million, the Bank of England loaning money on its own stock
and the Royal African company lending in £102,000.
plenty

of money

in

Exchange

Alley

there

were

With

plenty

of

promoters hawking what came to be known as "bubble companies."
Eighty-eight of these companies were promoted just in the
month of June, 1720.
The British government, at the urging of the South Sea
Company, passed the Bubble Act which effectively shut down
these upstart bubble companies.

Ironically, the enforcement

of this Act against four companies served to burst the bubble,
and speculators rushed to sell.

By December of 1720, South

Sea stock was trading at 12 0.
The Company was bankrupt, and had no real quality assets
to begin with, but speculators were not cognizant of this as
the market began to feed on itself.
relation

to

the

Mississippi

Bubble,

This episode was,
short-lived.

in
The

difference being that the Bank of England, in an effort to
raise needed liquidity, began calling in loans, not to mention
not making new ones, and also offering interest bearing notes
to depositors,

the

equivalent of

selling

certificates

of
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deposit in modern banking.

John Law, with his Royal Bank, had

taken the opposite strategy, by creating money to support the
shares, which only prolonged the Mississippi Bubble crisis.
The explanation for the cause of speculative bubbles
comes to us by examining the Austrian school's theory of the
trade cycle.

This theory, formulated by second generation

Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek,
in fact has its roots, according to Mises (1983, 1) with the
English "Currency School." Unfortunately, the Currency School
did not realize that unbacked bank accounts were equivalent to
unbacked bank notes in terms of expanding excessive credit.
Thus, as the Bank of England was forced to suspend payment on
numerous occasions,

it appeared that the Currency School's

explanation of the trade cycle was erroneous,

and the view

that the trade cycle had nothing to do with money or credit,
but instead Keynes' "animal spirits," came to the fore.
The key point of the Austrian trade theory is that an
increase in the supply of money engenders an economic "boom"
followed subsequently by the correction of that ma1investment,
or "bust", which is characterized by less money or credit.
The business cycle is initially generated by some sort of
monetary
world by

intervention in the market, typically

in themodern

bank credit expansion to business. However,

this

monetary intervention could be in the form of the following,
listed by Haberler (1983, 9):
a)
b)

An increase of gold and legal tender
An increase of banknotes.

money.
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c)
d)

An increase of bank deposits and bank credits.
An increase in the circulation of checks,
bills, and other means of payment which are
regularly or occasionally substituted for
ordinary money.
An increase of the velocity of circulation of
one or all these means of payments.

e)

People, as they earn money, spend some on consumption,
keep

some

in cash balances,

while the

invested in capital or production.
means

is

saved

or

For most people, this

setting aside a portion of their

stocks,

rest

income by buying

bonds or bank certificates of deposits or savings

accounts.

People determine the amount they wish to put in

savings by their time preferences, i.e., the measure of their
preference for present as opposed to future consumption.

The

less they prefer consumption in the present, the lower their
time preference.

The

collective

time preferences

savers determines the pure interest rate.

for all

Thus, the lower the

time preference, the lower the pure rate of interest.

This

lower time-preference rate leads to greater proportions of
investment to consumption, and therefore an extension of the
production

structure,

serving

to

increase

total

capital.

Conversely, higher time preferences do the opposite, with high
interest rates, truncation of the production structure, and an
abatement of capital.

The final array of various market

interest rates are composed of the pure interest rate plus
purchasing power components and the range of entrepreneurial
risk factors.

But the key component of this equation is the

pure interest rate.
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When a monetary intervention,
occurs,

as talked about above,

the effect is the same as if the collective time

preferences of the public had fallen.
available for investment increases,
supply, interest rates fall.

The amount of money
and with this greater

In turn, entrepreneurs respond

to what they believe is an increase in savings, or a decrease
in time preferences.

These entrepreneurs then invest this

capital in "higher orders" in the structure of production,
which are further from the final consumer.

Investment

then shifts from consumer goods to capital goods industries.
Prices and wages are bid up in these capital goods industries.
But the money does not immediately go into production,

as

Mises (1978, 161) writes:
The moderated
interest rate is intended to
stimulate production and not to cause a stock
market boom. However, stock prices increase first
of all.
At the outset, commodity prices are not
caught up in the boom.
There are stock exchange
booms and stock exchange profits.
Yet, the
"producer"
is dissatisfied.
He envies the
"speculator" his "easy profit." Those in power are
not willing to accept this situation. They believe
that production is being deprived of money which is
flowing into the stock market.
Besides, it is
precisely in the stock market boom that the serious
threat of a crisis lies' hidden.
This shift to capital goods industries would be fine if
people's time preferences had actually lessened.
not the case.

But this is

As the newly created money quickly permeates

from business borrowers to wages, rents, and interest, the
recipients of these higher incomes will spend the money in the
same proportions of consumption-investment as they did before.
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Thus, demand quickly turns from capital goods back to consumer
goods.

Unfortunately, capital goods producers now have an

increased

amount

of goods

for

sale

and

no

corresponding

increase in demand from their entrepreneurial customers.
This wasteful malinvestment is then liquidated,

typically

termed a crash, bust or crisis, which is the market's way of
purging itself, the first step back to health.

The ensuing

recession or depression is the market's adjustment period from
the malinvestments back to the normal efficient service
of customer demands.
This process or cycle can occur in a relatively short
period of time.

However, the booms are sometimes prolonged by

more doses of monetary intervention.

The greater the monetary

expansion, both in magnitude and length of time, the longer
the

boom

will

be

sustained

(as

was

the

case

with

the

weed

out

Mississippi Bubble).
The

recovery

phase,

or

recession

will

inefficient and unprofitable businesses that were possibly
engendered by, or propped up by the money induced boom.

The

recovery is also characterized by an increase in the "natural
rate"

or

pure

rate

of

interest.

In

other

words,

time

preferences increase, which leads to a fall in the prices of
higher-order goods in relation to those of consumer goods.
Rothbard (1983a, 21) writes:
Not only prices of particular machines must fall,
but also the prices of whole aggregates of capital,
e.g., stock market and real estate values.
In
fact, these values must fall more than the earnings

As
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from the assets, through reflecting the general
rise in the rate of interest return.
In the

final

analysis,

monetary

intervention

cannot

increase the supply of real goods, it merely diverts capital
from

avenues

the market

malinvestment.

would

dictate,

towards

wasteful

The boom created has no solid base, and thus

"it is illusory prosperity" (Mises, 1978, 183) .
The three episodes, addressed in this paper, are examples
of malinvestment at, in retrospect, its most ludicrous.

All

were created by different examples of monetary intervention.
The Tulipmania was engendered and fueled by a massive influx
of specie into Amsterdam,

see Haberler's

"a" above.

The

Mississippi Bubble was driven by a blizzard of John Law's
paper, see "b" and "d" above.

The South Sea Bubble was formed

by the modern banking tools of deposits and credits, along
with increasing, as Murphy (1986, 73) relates: "the velocity
of

circulation

of

money

by

lending

money

to

potential

purchasers of its stock," see "c" and "e" above.
All three objects of speculation were equally dubious in
terms of their investment value.

With all due respect to Mr.

Garber, in no way can a cogent argument be made to support how
the value of a tulip bulb could be greater than the land it is
grown in.

John

Law's Mississippi Company had the appearance

of a powerful company, but the majority of its assets were the
debts of a bankrupt country.

As Wagner (1980, 13) apply puts,

"Counterfeiting becomes a profitable activity, one that the
state customarily tries to reserve for its own use."

This
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counterfeiting was Law's only asset, but as we learned from
Mises,

it cannot create real prosperity.

The South Sea

Company, similar to the Mississippi Company, was capitalized
with government debt, and was technically bankrupt.
The bust, in all three cases, served to liquidate the
malinvestments, the break being sharper in the Tulipmania and
South

Sea

cases.

In

both

these

cases

a

sound

alternative was available for capital to flee to.
Mississippi
worthless

Bubble

case,

the

only

alternative

stock was his worthless currency.

money
In the

to

Law's

The ensuing

recessions were painful, although short, and
in the case of France engendered a healthy distrust of paper
money

which

served

that

country

well.

In

the

case

of

England's handling of the South Sea episode, a mistake was
made in not allowing the full brunt of the crisis to be played
out.

This is a mistake that has been and continues to be

repeated constantly throughout history.

In times of financial

panic a "lifeboat operation" is employed.

As Mises (1978,

142) explains:
If the crisis were ruthlessly permitted to run its
course,
bringing
about
the
destruction
of
enterprises which were unable to meet their
obligations, then all entrepreneurs-not only banks
but also other businessmen-would exhibit more
caution in granting and using credit in the future.
Instead,
public
opinion
approves
of
giving
assistance in the crisis.
Then, no sooner is the
worst over, than the banks are spurred on to a new
expansion of circulation credit.
Robert Walpole was possibly the originator of the "life
boat operation" in 1721, and his legacy continues to live on
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in a modern world were we have unbacked fiat currency and
central banking expanding and contracting (mostly expanding)
the supply of money at every political whim.
from one speculative bubble,
resounding crash,

Thus, we live

or economic boom to the next

only to reinflate the supply of money,

serving to maintain a shaky scaffolding under inefficient
enterprise and bloated governments, forestalling the
inevitable complete bust.
Modern

history

is

riddled

with

the

occurrence

of

speculative bubbles and their inevitable crashes: Britain's
railroad mania,

the 1929 and 1987 stock market booms and

subsequent crashes in the United States,

Japan's stock market

and property booms in the late 1980's.

The common factor to

all has been a monetary intervention or tremendous increase in
the

supply

of

ma1investments.

money,

ultimately

leading

to

these

These bubbles also share the common trait

that the object or manifestation of the monetary intervention
was a familiar investment instrument, i.e., stocks and/or real
estate;

nothing as obscure as tulips, until recently that is,

when the boom in China's stamp market was recently revealed.1
The

genesis

for

this

bubble?

Money,

of

course:

it

is

estimated that savings deposits in China have grown to one
trillion yuan.

This vast increase in the supply of money has

forced interest rates on bank savings accounts down to less
than two per cent!

Thus, speculators and others

have turned

to stamps, pushing the price of some stamps up five-hundred
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per cent in a two year period.
With no contraction of China's monetary policy, the only
thing that has stopped China's only free market is government
coercion.

The

Chinese

authorities

began

a crackdown

attempt to close down the market last November 9th.

to
Now

Beijing's Yuetan Park is quiet, after being a site of trading
activity as frenzied as that of the taverns of 17th century
Amsterdam, of Paris' Rue Quincampoix, or of London's Exchange
Alley.

But too much money must go somewhere, and China's

stamp speculators are now trying to guess what the object of
China's next bubble will be, stocks2 or antiques.
As long as we live in a world in which the supply of
money is being manipulated by governments, rather than set by
the free and unfettered market, monetary interventions will
continue to be the norm.

Although much time has passed since

the occurence of the three episodes discussed in this paper,
the

laws

of

economics

do

not

change

with

time.

The

consequences of monetary interventions have always been and
will continue to be; booms and subsequent busts.
bubbles

are

the ultimate manifestation

induced booms.

Speculative

of these monetary

It is impossible to know what the object

of the next speculative bubble will be, or exactly when it
will occur.

What has been shown in this paper is that these

bubbles, or malinvestments are engendered by increases in the
supply of money, with the ensuing busts inevitably to follow;
leading once again to bankruptcys and financial pain, as these

wasteful investments are converted to more productive assets.
What can be predicated with absolute accuracy is that fiat
money, fractional reserve banking, central banks, Keynesian
monetary policies and self-serving politicians will combine to
ensure that there will be many more booms and specualtive
bubbles for future economists and historians to chronical.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. See "China Cancels Its Red-Hot Stamp Market, But Traders Hope
Crackdown Will Pass", by James McGregor. Wall Street Journal.
December 19, 1991. pg. Cl.
2. China has two stock exchanges, one in Shanghai, the other in
Shenzhen. McGregor (WSJ, Cl) indicates that 15 new stock listings
were to be added to the existing 14 already trading on the
exchange.
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